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ABSTRACT
Early intellectual humility research has largely relied on questionnaires that require individuals
to self-evaluate their own intellectual humility, despite concerns that people low in intellectual
humility may lack awareness of their degree of intellectual humility. Because of this potential
source of error, it is important that self-report measures of intellectual humility are thoroughly
tested for validity. In Chapter 1, I conducted a systematic literature review of measures of
intellectual humility. For each measure, validity evidence is summarized and critically evaluated.
Validity evidence was found lacking with respect to addressing potentially serious problems with
self-report. This finding points to a need for additional validity testing for self-report measures of
intellectual humility. In Chapter 2, I conducted a set of pointed tests of validity for one such
measure, the General Intellectual Humility Scale (GIHS). In a sample recruited from Prolific (N
= 481), GIHS scores were weakly associated with or unassociated with endorsement of
epistemically unwarranted beliefs, unassociated with endorsing such beliefs as certainly true, and
unassociated with endorsing such beliefs despite claiming to have carefully researched the issue.
Additionally, GIHS scores predicted greater bias blind spot, and this effect remained significant
when controlling for science intelligence. Finally, GIHS scores predicted belief in anthropogenic
global warming when controlling for political orientation but did not attenuate political
polarization about global warming. I argue that these findings are clear departures from theory
yet are consistent with suspected problems with direct self-report. I conclude by discussing
limitations and implications for future research.
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1
1 A CRITICAL REVIEW OF MEASURES OF TRAIT
INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
In the past decade, intellectual humility has emerged as a topic of interest in
psychological research (VanTongeren et al., 2019). Whereas early work developing measures of
general humility proceeded somewhat slowly (Davis et al., 2010), early intellectual humility
research has resulted in the rapid development and publication of several measurement
instruments in parallel (McElroy-Heltzel et al., 2019; Porter et al., 2021). With an abundance of
simultaneously developed instruments now published, each featuring different definitions,
conceptualizations, and decisions about validity testing, there is a need to evaluate how they are
conceptually related to each other, the evidence supporting each instrument, and what additional
validity evidence is needed.
Intellectual humility has its roots in an area of philosophy known as virtue epistemology
(Baehr, 2011). Whereas virtue epistemology as a topic encompasses a diverse body of
philosophical thought, generally virtue epistemology concerns the role of intellectual character in
addressing foundational questions about knowledge and other forms of cognitive success (Alfano
et al., 2019). Among the projects undertaken by virtue epistemologists are efforts to identify and
understand specific epistemic virtues and vices, and intellectual humility has been noted as one
of these virtues (Baehr, 2011; Roberts & Wood, 2003).
Several formal accounts of the nature of intellectual humility have been published in
recent years, mostly in conjunction with the emergence of intellectual humility as a topic in
psychology (Church, 2016; Hazlett, 2012; Roberts & Wood, 2003; Samuelson, et al., 2015;
Tanesini, 2018; Whitcomb et al., 2017). Of these accounts, it is the limitations-owning account
of Whitcomb et al. (2017) that has perhaps had the greatest influence on psychological measures
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of intellectual humility. It has been acknowledged as influential or foundational in the conceptual
work associated with several measures (Alfano et al., 2017; Haggard et al., 2018; Hoyle et al.,
2016; Leary et al., 2017; Zachry et al., 2018), and awareness of limitations is the only content
theme reflected in the items of every measure of intellectual humility (Porter et al., 2021, p. 5).
The limitations-owning account is an attempt to provide a definition of intellectual humility that
encompasses the strengths of prior conceptual work on intellectual humility while addressing
problems and ambiguities of those accounts. On the limitations-owning account, intellectual
humility is defined as the proper attentiveness to and ownership of one’s intellectual limitations,
which is generally described as a disposition to properly be aware of and take responsibility for
intellectual limitations (Whitcomb et al., 2017). As an attempt at unifying prior work, it is argued
that many qualities expected of intellectual humility follow from this either directly or as general
psychological expectations, including the stronger elements of other accounts of intellectual
humility – holding beliefs with appropriate firmness (Samuelson et al., 2015), having proper
beliefs about the epistemic status of one’s beliefs (Hazlett, 2012), a genuine modesty and lack of
overconfidence in intellectual strengths (Driver, 2001), and low vanity and low arrogance
(Roberts & Wood, 2007).
A potential weakness of the limitations-owning account is that the definition does not
include anything that prevents an intellectually humble person from also being arrogant (Church,
2017) and instead argues that a lack of improper pride is only expected to accompany
limitations-owning for extra-definitional, psychological reasons (Whitcomb et al., 2017, pp. 2025). A later published attempt at synthesizing prior work including the limitations-owning
account avoided this problem by defining intellectual humility as consisting of two aspects –
modesty and accuracy (Tanesini, 2018). Whereas the limitations-owning account has been more
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directly influential on psychological measures, it is this broader synthesis by Tanesini that
captures the breadth of conceptualizations in psychology, as will be shown.
Though not generally the primary focus of philosophical accounts, philosophers have
included psychological descriptions of intellectual humility in their work with greater specificity
than most psychological accounts, which tend to rely on a general trait designation (cf. Leary et
al, 2017). Accounts of intellectual humility as proper belief confidence and proper higher-order
epistemic attitudes situate intellectual humility as cognitive and meta-cognitive in nature (Barrett
& Church, 2017; Hazlett, 2012). On the limitations-owning account, intellectual humility results
from personal dispositions that span affective, behavioral, and cognitive domains, though this is
stated generally without attempting to provide specifics (Whitcomb et al., 2017). Arguably the
most complete psychological account of intellectual humility across either psychological or
philosophical literature is Tanesini’s (2018)—defining intellectual humility as a cluster of
attitudes, dedicating a significant portion her paper to a technical description of attitudes as
understood in social psychology, and arguing that an attitude cluster is capable of being a virtue.
In psychological research, conceptualizations of intellectual humility reflect a synthesis
of prior research on general humility as a personality trait and philosophical accounts of
intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue. As with other humility-related constructs, an
intellectually humble person is expected to display a humble character (e.g., McElroy et al.,
2014). The influence of virtue epistemic accounts is apparent, however, in that expectations of
intellectual humility generally involve cognitive sophistication (e.g., considering evidence,
recognizing fallibility, thinking carefully, avoiding specific biases; Haggard et al., 2018; Hoyle et
al., 2016; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Leary et al., 2017; McElroy et al., 2014). Whereas
psychological conceptualizations of intellectual humility all describe both humble character and
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cognitive sophistication as qualities that will be associated with intellectual humility, there is
significant diversity of definitions in the extent to which humble character and cognitive
sophistication are core to the trait. At one end of the spectrum, IH has been defined as a
subdomain of general humility like any other — possessing a humble character with respect to
intellectual matters — without any added cognitive or epistemic elements (McElroy et al., 2014).
This conceptualization is aligned with Tanesini’s (2018) modesty aspect. At the other end of the
continuum, IH has been characterized entirely as cognitive disposition without any reference to
emotion or interpersonal behavior (Hoyle et al., 2016; Leary et al., 2017), and this aligns with
Tanesini’s (2018) accuracy aspect. Most conceptualizations, however, define or characterize
intellectual humility as essentially involving both modesty and accuracy aspects — a humble
personal character along with cognitive sophistication (Alfano et al., 2017; Haggard et al., 2018;
Hill et al., 2019; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Zachry et al., 2018). Altogether, then,
intellectual humility as a subject of psychological research can generally be thought of as
encompassing humble character in intellectual matters (modesty) as well as a cognitive
disposition to be aware of and appropriately responsible for one’s own epistemic limitations
(accuracy).
Challenges for Self-Report Measurement of Intellectual Humility
The question of how intellectual humility might be measured has been addressed from
multiple perspectives and has also been a matter of some debate (Church & Samuelson, 2017,
pp. 76-78; Church, 2018; Davis et al., 2019; Kotzee, 2015). In discussions of measurement
validity, some scholars have noted the possibility of significant bias being introduced through the
use of self-report questionnaires because intellectual humility involves accurate self-awareness
of limitations and the lack of intellectual humility involves a lack of awareness of limitations
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(e.g., Christen et al., 2019; Brienza et al., 2018). This echoes well-known concerns about the
seeming paradox of self-attributions of humility and related qualities (e.g., Garcia, 2006;
Tangney, 2000). Discussions of this problem in the context of intellectual humility measure
development have generally argued that such concerns are addressable through testing and
potentially controlling for socially desirable responding (e.g., Church & Samuelson, 2017, pp.
82-83) and by arguing that prior work on general humility has not shown evidence of a modesty
effect (e.g., Leary et al., 2017; cf. Zettler, et al., 2016). However, though desirability bias and
modesty effects are relevant concerns for humility-related constructs, the far greater challenge is
that intellectual humility seems to be required in order to provide an accurate self-report of
intellectual humility, even in the absence of any common form of response bias.
The contradiction involved in the self-report assessment of intellectual humility is in
relying on people who are unaware of their intellectual limitations to report accurately about the
degree to which they are aware of and responsible for their intellectual limitations. Consider the
example of a person who dismisses evidence that conflicts with important beliefs as false. When
that person is asked how they respond to evidence that challenges an important belief, they will
not consider those instances at all because they perceived themselves to be rejecting a falsehood
rather than evidence. Such a person might be free from any inclination toward desirable
responding yet would nevertheless produce an inaccurate and positively biased self-report. A
similar effect of not being able to assess one’s limitations has been shown with respect to a
variety of skills relevant to intellectual humility (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) including in the
assessment of one’s own reasoning abilities, which is particularly relevant for how someone
might experience themselves in disagreements (Pennycook et al., 2017). That this is common
enough to be relevant for measurement considerations is also evident in the consistency with
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which highly implausible ideas (e.g., flat Earth theory) are argued by advocates to be readily
apparent to anyone who will exercise critical thinking and carefully consider the evidence. In
addition to the possibility of excessively favorable self-report, the opposite problem might also
occur. Those who are most aware of their limitations will best be able to identify those
limitations as they manifest and then recall them when providing a self-report. An intellectually
humble person could therefore earnestly rate themselves with lower scores than others who
strongly value those qualities, and this would be due to superior accuracy rather than any attempt
to downplay strengths. These potential complications draw attention to the need to carefully
consider the response process involved in the direct self-report of intellectual humility.
In self-report measures of intellectual humility, items focus on behaviors that are
generally expected of any reasonable person — considering opposing opinions (Porter &
Schumann, 2018), revising beliefs to align with evidence (Leary et al, 2017), acknowledging
fallibility (Hoyle et al., 2016), being respectful of others during a disagreement (KrumreiMancuso et al., 2016), caring about the truth (Haggard et al., 2018), and so on. People who are
strongly invested in being correct — for whatever reason — are likely to try to embody those
qualities if for no other reason than to be correct more often. Exhibiting these qualities
consistently, however, requires much more than a strong desire to be correct, and the final
element required for accurate self-evaluation is an assessment of how consistently these are
applied in practice. For this component of the response process, those who are lowest in
intellectual humility are likely to be least aware of their limitations with respect to intellectual
humility and provide a correspondingly inflated self-report (e.g. “I am always reasonable”).
Those who are high in intellectual humility are most likely at this point to reflect on their own
fallibility and weigh that in their response (e.g. “I’m prone to bias just like anyone else”).
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Altogether this suggests that, among people who strongly value qualities related to intellectual
humility, intellectual humility may have an opposite influence on scores than supposed1.
Limitations of Traditional Validation Practices
If this problem exists, traditional questionnaire validation practices are unlikely to have
detected it for several reasons. One complication for detecting this problem in validation studies
is that merely recognizing the epistemic value of intellectual humility is likely to be associated
with outcomes relevant to intellectual humility, because beliefs about knowledge and knowing
are predictive of intellectual strengths and positive epistemic outcomes (Baron, 1991; Sandoval
et al., 2016). For example, even someone low in intellectual humility might have strong critical
thinking skills that lead them to recognize the value of considering the opinions of others,
acknowledging error, and revising opinions when presented with new (Bailin et al., 1999; Toplak
et al., 2014). In contrast, someone who lacks intellectual humility due to willful antiintellectualism would likely not endorse those qualities. In this way, many expected correlates of
intellectual humility should also be expected to correlate with merely valuing intellectual
humility. Factor analytic evidence is also unlikely to have identified this problem because, when
item content fails to adequately target the intended construct as expected, conventional practices
of questionnaire development can nevertheless produce encouraging-seeming structural evidence
of validity (Maul, 2017; Rhemtulla et al., 2017). Because even serious problems of measurement
validity can go unnoticed in the course of normal psychological research if the assumptions
underlying a measurement claim are not considered carefully, the accumulation of publications

This idea is referred to differently throughout the manuscript for different emphasis—valuing intellectual humility,
associates of valuing intellectual humility, specific associates such as rationality or critical thinking, etc. In every
case, this idea is what is meant—that scores primarily reflect valuing qualities associated with the accuracy aspect
of intellectual humility (i.e. trying to be a reasonable person) and that, among people who strongly hold those
values, intellectual humility may be inversely related to scores.
1
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featuring a measure should also not be taken as evidence of the absence of a problem of this kind
(Borsboom, 2006).
Discriminant evidence of validity (also called discriminant validity or, for some
applications, incremental validity) refers to a form of evidence often intended to show that scores
are not reflecting some other construct or set of constructs instead of the target construct (AERA,
APA, & NCME, 2014, pp. 16-17). When addressing whether scores reflect the target construct
rather than related or confounding constructs, discriminant evidence frequently takes the form of
statistical analyses showing that the scores under investigation predict unique variance in
relevant outcomes beyond what is predicted by measures of rival or confounding constructs
(Hunsley & Meyer, 2003). This approach is limited, however, in that the statistical methods
employed are prone to produce favorable-seeming but spurious results when measurement error
is not modeled in the analysis, something often overlooked in psychological research and also
not attempted in the intellectual humility literature thus far (Westfall & Yarkoni, 2016). At the
same time, modeling measurement error in such analyses can introduce additional and
potentially worse problems when the measurement model is inaccurate, which is common, and
addressing this problem can involve methodological roadblocks (Rhemtulla et al., 2020). For
these reasons, the question of whether validity evidence demonstrated for an intellectual humility
measure is attributable to merely valuing intellectual humility is not likely to have been
adequately addressed by any single statistical demonstration and instead requires theoretical
attention and broad consideration of all evidence.
Evidence Needed to Support Self-Report Measures of Intellectual Humility
In part due to the generally confirmatory nature of initial validation practices (Kane,
2006; Maul, 2017), a relatively recent advancement in the measurement validity literature has
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been to emphasize the importance of evaluating validity evidence with a focus on the primary
challenge to the proposed interpretation of scores (Kane, 2013). This builds upon prior guidance
that the priority for validity testing is addressing the most plausible and high-impact threats to
the validity argument (Cronbach, 1989; Crooks, et al., 1996). Having argued here for a specific
threat to validity that is both highly likely and high impact, for this review, I consider the most
important quality of validity evidence for a self-report measure of intellectual humility to be the
extent to which that evidence would not be expected of merely valuing intellectual humility.
The clearest such evidence will be association with behaviors or observations that are
clear and direct displays of intellectual humility. Examples of such behaviors noted in formal
philosophical accounts of the virtue include admitting limitations to self and others when doing
so is otherwise difficult (Roberts & Wood, 2007; Tanesini, 2018; Whitcomb et al., 2017), not
being excessively confident in one’s own beliefs (Church, 2016; Hazlett, 2012; Roberts & Wood,
2003; Whitcomb et al., 2017), seeking or accepting help when needed on intellectual matters
(Whitcomb et al., 2017), appropriately making concessions in intellectual disagreement (Hazlett,
2012; Tanesini, 2018), displaying intellectual modesty and low egotism (Roberts & Wood, 2003;
Tanesini, 2018), appropriately qualifying claims according to the supporting evidence (Schwab,
2012), acknowledgement of uncertainty or ignorance (Church & Barrett, 2016; Hazlett, 2012;
Whitcomb et al., 2017), and attempting to remedy intellectual limitations (Whitcomb et al.,
2017). Though this is not a comprehensive list of behaviors characteristic of intellectual
humility, this set of examples provides an idea of what would clearly indicate intellectual
humility in contrast with merely valuing intellectual humility.
Because direct displays of intellectual humility such as these can be difficult to facilitate
in the context of psychological research with large samples, survey-based studies may rely on an
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inference to intellectual humility from associated attributes. Examples of such attributes include
high intellectual engagement, knowledge and intelligence, critical thinking ability, appropriate
skepticism, enthusiasm about science or rational discourse, open-mindedness, agreeableness,
curiosity, proper belief commitment, and myriad forms of cognitive sophistication (media
literacy, science understanding, specific expertise, etc.). Because these qualities are generally
also expected to be associated with valuing intellectual humility, observations related to these
attributes cannot be assumed to reflect intellectual humility without a convincing supporting
argument. This argument will be more straightforward to the degree that context makes
intellectual humility salient. For example, critical thinking is more relevant to intellectual
humility when it is applied to one’s own views. Providing a charitable (and empathetic) account
of an opposing view is more relevant than simply knowing about an opposing view.
With these considerations in mind, the strongest form of evidence in support of a measure
of intellectual humility will be clear association with observations characteristic of intellectual
humility that cannot be attributed to qualities such as intelligence, critical thinking abilities, or
high engagement. Though much less compelling than the strongest form of evidence, the next
most promising form of evidence will involve observations that are associated with intellectual
humility but which could alternatively be attributed to qualities such as intelligence, critical
thinking abilities, or high engagement. Less clear to interpret will be observations that are clearly
attributable to qualities such as intelligence, critical thinking abilities, or high intellectual
engagement. Due to difficulties with interpretation with respect to the primary threat to validity,
significantly less compelling than direct observations will be generally favorable correlations
with relevant self-report trait measures. Least persuasive will be correlations with loosely related
trait measures.
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It is important to note that these standards of evidence pertain to addressing a particular
serious threat to validity. Addressing this threat is a necessary but not sufficient condition of an
overall demonstration of validity. In addition to showing that scores are associated with
intellectual humility and not merely with valuing intellectual humility, a complete validity
argument for a measure of trait intellectual humility would need to establish that scores perform
well across the domain of behaviors that characterize intellectual humility and do so across
relevant situational contexts. Because such arguments generally require support from a
substantial program of research, at this early stage, the priority is on evaluating the promise of
evidence gathered so far (Kane, 2013). Furthermore, the identified threat concerns reporting on
one’s intellectual limitations, so for the two measures that do not involve intellectual limitations,
evaluation will focus more on general standards of validity evidence (e.g., Messick, 1989).
Because fundamental problems with self-report have not been adequately addressed thus
far in validity testing for intellectual humility measures or in reviews of such measures, I set out
to conduct a critical review of intellectual humility measures with a focus on evaluating evidence
with these challenges in mind. Additionally, during this research, an analysis of descriptions of
the intellectual humility construct across measurement papers was conducted, and the resulting
content areas and descriptions are also reported here.
Method
Literature Search and Inclusion Criteria
I conducted a search on August 16, 2021 using PsychInfo for articles and citations
containing the phrase intellectual humility in the title, abstract, or article text, returning 145
results. Another search was conducted on the same date using ProQuest Social Science Premium
Collection for same phrase anywhere in the text and limiting results to scholarly journals,
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returning 344 results. The titles and abstracts of these articles were reviewed for references to the
empirical study of intellectual humility or like concepts (e.g. willingness to admit to being
wrong), and those articles were checked for a questionnaire measure of trait intellectual humility
(including self-report and other-report questionnaires but excluding coding schemes, state
measures, and situated measures). This resulted in the identification of 14 distinct questionnaire
measures and additional variant adaptations of these (e.g., slight modifications to target narrower
content domains). These articles, as well as reviews of intellectual humility, were also checked
for reference to measures that may have been missed by the search, resulting in the addition of
one measure. In total, 15 distinct trait questionnaires were identified through the search. Of these,
measures with published validation studies were selected for inclusion, resulting in 10
questionnaire measures of trait intellectual humility to be reviewed.
Reporting Procedure
For each instrument, the published validity argument was reviewed. First, the definition
and general theory accompanying the conceptualization and operationalization of the construct
are described. Second, the basic structure of each measure is reported, including information
regarding the number and interpretation of factors, the number of items in each scale and
subscale, as well the item that accounts for the most subscale variance in the reported factor
analysis. Third, I report the reported range on the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, as well as
temporal stability. If applicable, I also report results of measurement invariance tests. Fourth, I
report other evidence of validity presented by measure authors, including convergent,
discriminant, and criterion-related evidence.2

For the sake of brevity, evidence is discussed as having been displayed for or by the test (e.g. “The measure
showed evidence of validity in relationships with…”), but this is more properly expressed as, “the proposed
interpretation of scores attached to the measure was supported by scores being related with…”
2
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Results of Review
A summary description and critical review of validity evidence for each scale follows.
Content domain descriptions were organized into themes inspired by previous work on general
humility measures (McElroy-Heltzel et al., 2019) and are provided in Table 1.1. Summary data
are reported in Table 1.2.
General Intellectual Humility Scale (GIHS)
The General Intellectual Humility Scale (GIHS; Leary et al., 2017) is a self-report
measure that consists of six items with response choices arranged on a 5-point Likert-like scale
ranging from not at all like me to very like me. The authors of the GIHS define intellectual
humility as “recognizing that a particular personal belief may be fallible, accompanied by an
appropriate attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis of that belief and to one’s own
limitations in obtaining and evaluating relevant information” (Leary et al., p. 793).
This is a narrower conceptualization than those employed by developers of other
measures of general intellectual humility and is unique among such measures in its exclusive
focus on epistemic and cognitive aspects of IH. The GIHS conceptualization features cognitive
and metacognitive processes (monitoring, recognition, attending, evaluating), epistemic
considerations (doubt, belief revision, assigning trust) and identifies IH with favorable epistemic
outcomes (recognizing fallible beliefs in light of evidence). This represents one end of the
spectrum of conceptualizations in contrast to other measures that all include references to either
interpersonal or affective qualities and lack any reference to justified or fallible beliefs instead
of, for instance, intellectual fallibility in general.
The GIHS is a single-factor instrument comprised of items such as “I accept that my
beliefs and attitudes may be wrong.” Cronbach’s alpha values for GIHS scores ranged from .73
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to .87 across six samples. Temporal stability was not reported given that no longitudinal study
was included. In the initial validation studies, Leary et al. (2017) showed convergent evidence of
validity in confirming expected correlations between the GIHS and openness (r = .33), the
interest component of epistemic curiosity (r = .35), existential quest (r = .35), need for cognition
(r = .34), dogmatism (r = -.49), intolerance of ambiguity (r = -.32), and self-righteousness (r = .35). Other effects were found for self-attributions of intellectual humility (r =.37) and openmindedness (r =.35). There were two results that did not align with the authors’ predictions and
that were accordingly noted as surprising. The GIHS failed to show the expected relationships
with narcissism (expected a negative relationship, no relationship found) and social vigilantism
(expected a negative relationship, no relationship found).
The GIHS showed initial criterion-related evidence of validity in a series of three
experimental studies, yet some predicted results were not observed. In the first study, multiple
regression was conducted involving GIHS scores, religiosity, experimental condition (reading
pro-, anti-, or balanced essays about religion), and response to reading a persuasive essay on
religion (affect, agreement, perceived accuracy, impressions of the author). Results showed that
the GIHS predicted less extreme religious views, less certainty and superiority about one’s own
religious views, greater agreement with essay arguments, more favorable evaluation of the
accuracy of balanced and anti-religious arguments, preference for balanced rather than one-sided
arguments, and more positive character judgements about the authors across essay conditions.
The authors noted that, though these findings were generally consistent with expectations of IH,
examination of the interaction between the article condition and IH revealed the absence of the
expected effect of IH in predicting more favorable evaluations of argument accuracy in the proreligion essay condition. The authors proposed this could be due to their sample being more
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prone to agree with the pro-religion essay (23% of the sample disagreed with the pro-religion
essay whereas 56% disagreed with the anti-religion essay), leaving less room for IH to have an
effect in moderating the influence of disagreeableness.
In the second study, the GIHS was tested for its ability to predict more favorable attitudes
toward people who change their beliefs (Leary et al., 2017). Participants were asked for their
political identity affiliation (Republican, Independent, or Democrat) and presented with a
fictional political candidate who previously supported an unspecified position about the
environment but had now come to hold the opposite view after learning more and realizing he
was wrong. Participants were randomly assigned such that the candidate was described as either
Republican or Democrat. Results showed that, as expected, those scoring high on the GIHS were
more likely to believe and vote for a candidate who had changed his position on an issue and less
likely to characterize the change as flip-flopping to win votes. However, the authors noted that
this finding was qualified in that the effect was found only for Republicans and that the GIHS
did not find the expected effect of a more favorable attitude toward change of beliefs among
Democrats or Independents. The authors suggested that the effect observed for Republicans may
be the result of especially negative attitudes toward change of political position among
Republicans and that IH would therefore be especially relevant to moderating judgements among
Republicans in particular. The authors did not offer any additional explanation concerning the
absence of the predicted effects of IH among Democrats or Independents.
In the third study, the GIHS was tested in relation to ability to distinguish strong from
weak arguments both generally and when the argument is personally relevant to them.
Participants were presented with persuasive essays about flossing featuring arguments that were
either weak and anecdotal or strong and scientific and were asked to select the most compelling
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reasons for flossing from a set of mixed strong and weak reasons. Participants reported how
often they floss and in the analysis were categorized into flosser and non-flosser groups.
Results showed that non-flossers high in IH drew clearer distinctions between strong
rather than weak arguments in favor of flossing, endorsed the stronger reasons for flossing, and
reported being influenced by strong arguments more than by weak arguments. In contrast, nonflossers low in IH did not show these effects. Contrary to predictions, however, these effects
were not observed even to a lesser degree among flossers, for whom IH did not predict
effectively distinguishing between strong and weak arguments and did not predict reporting
being more influenced by strong rather than weak evidence. The authors had predicted that the
personal relevance of potentially changing a behavior would motivate flossers to engage the
information critically whereas non-flossers would be less motivated due to it being of no
practical consequence to their ongoing behavior. Thus, they were correct in that they expected
high IH would show more sizable effects when the information was more personally relevant.
However, they were incorrect in predicting those high in IH would still show the effects to a
lesser degree. Finally, IH did not predict greater reported intent to floss in the coming week
following reading arguments for why flossing is important. Leary et al. (2017) investigated
discriminant validity of the GIHS as well during this third outcome-focused study by comparing
the GIHS with need for closure in their analysis. Results provided discriminant evidence of
validity in that the two constructs were found to be only weakly related (r = -.14, p = .007) and
because the GIHS showed similar relationships with outcomes even when controlling for need
for closure.
In addition to specific concerns raised about the results of individual studies, Leary et al.
(2017) acknowledged in their discussion that “many of the effect sizes for intellectual humility
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were relatively small, which could be interpreted as an indictment of general intellectual humility
as a construct” (p. 809). They argued against this conclusion, however, by offering the
alternative explanation that effects are small because myriad factors influence “people’s
reactions to beliefs, attitudes, and people with which they disagree” (Leary et al., 2017, p. 809)
and because general intellectual humility is subject to variation in expression across situations
and across topics.
Commentary on Evidence for the General Intellectual Humility Scale
The GIHS is supported by a specific account of the nature of intellectual humility as a
cognitive disposition. In addition to structural evidence and associations with other trait
measures, the validity study features three behavioral studies targeting qualities relevant to if not
characteristic of intellectual humility, the most of any validity paper for a measure of intellectual
humility. Each of these studies found evidence that could be attributed to intellectual humility,
and if the interpretations of that evidence proposed by the authors are warranted, then these
findings would arguably constitute a demonstration of GIHS scores being associated with
behaviors that are characteristic of intellectual humility as they have conceptualized it. At
minimum, then, the GIHS demonstrated in initial validity testing a clear capacity for reflecting
qualities associated with valuing intellectual humility. Determining whether the evidence
supports interpreting scores as reflecting intellectual humility requires a close look at key
observations from each study.
In the first of the behavioral studies, findings generally showed GIHS scores to be
associated with lesser certainty about and extremity of one’s own religious views and a more
favorable assessments of essays that included an anti-religious argument and more favorable
attributions about the authors of those essays. The key aspect of this study requiring scrutiny is
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the lack of effects with respect to the pro-religion essay. Though Leary et al. (2017) explained
this lack of effect as a function of fewer people in the sample finding the pro-religion article
disagreeable, an alternative explanation would be to take at face value the result that GIHS
scores do not predict greater acceptance of pro-religion articles among people who find religion
disagreeable. Whatever the reason for not observing a more favorable evaluation of pro-religion
articles, the lack of demonstrating this finding is consistent with GIHS scores primarily reflecting
valuing empirical evidence and rationality. This interpretation would be consistent with the more
favorable evaluation of anti-religion articles even for religious people — believers who place
strong value on evidence and rationality are likely to have had practice engaging with antireligion opinions and thus have a less negative response to the anti-religion articles. If the GIHS
were reflecting the ability to engage with disagreeable information and not just holding values
that rational discourse and empirical evidence are good, then scores should specifically predict
more moderate evaluation of pro-religion essays that strain anti-religion worldviews, but this was
not observed. It may be that the GIHS can demonstrate this property in subsequent research with
a diverse sample with respect to religious views.
A similar pattern was observed in that the GIHS was found to predict the expected
intellectual humility-relevant outcomes among Republicans but not among Democrats and
Independents. Leary et al. (2017) explained this finding by arguing that, because ideological
commitments that characterize conservatism result in negative attitudes toward change of beliefs,
high GIHS scores among Republicans are noteworthy departures from group norms in a way not
true of Independents and Democrats. This argument from Leary et al. favors the alternative
interpretation of GIHS scores as primarily reflecting epistemic values (i.e., it is good to change
one’s belief in response to evidence and reason) rather than reflecting intellectual humility.
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Between this finding and the findings from the study on religious beliefs, it seems that GIHS
scores may be more predictive of outcomes relevant to intellectual humility in groups where
strongly valuing reason and empirical evidence is not characteristic of the group.
The third study demonstrates a general effect that people use their critical thinking
abilities more when presented with information that suggests an individual may need to make
changes than when presented with information that is more congenial to existing beliefs and
behaviors (Ditto et al., 1998). Demonstrating that this effect is associated with GIHS scores is
evidence that scores predict a willingness or ability to engage with arguments and evidence,
which may be a necessary component of intellectual humility. However, this falls short as a
demonstration of intellectual humility because GIHS scores did not predict a disposition to
engage in critical thinking skills to evaluate congenial information, which would have been a
more noteworthy result with respect to intellectual humility.
Altogether, these results suggest that the GIHS reflects epistemic values associated with
intellectual humility, but the evidence does not clearly support GIHS scores as reflecting
intellectual humility in the cases that could differentiate this from intellectual humility. It may be
that, for individuals where even holding those values involves a strain against group norms or a
tension with other important values, GIHS scores will be more reflective of intellectual humility
in that group. In contrast, in groups where valuing intellectual humility is readily compatible
with group values, the GIHS may not be very predictive of intellectual humility. Additional
research is needed to investigate the properties of GIHS scores in various groups, but the clarity
of the conceptualization and clear evidence of results consistent with intellectual humility should
make the GIHS a focus of further research.
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Specific Intellectual Humility Scale
The Specific Intellectual Humility Scale (SIHS; Hoyle et al., 2016) is presented in both 9item and 3-item forms with responses on a 5-point scale anchored by not at all like me and very
like me. The SIHS was developed to assess intellectual humility with respect to any given subject
matter or topic (Hoyle et al., 2016). Items are designed to have a reference to a specific topic
inserted in the text. The SIHS was developed by some of the same researchers as the GIHS, and
the definition of intellectual humility on the SIHS is accordingly similar: “the recognition that a
particular personal view may be fallible, accompanied by an appropriate attentiveness to
limitations in the evidentiary basis of that view and to one’s own limitations in obtaining and
evaluating information relevant to it” (Hoyle et al., p. 165). As with the GIHS, this definition
reflects the same distinctly cognitive, epistemic, and normative conceptualization that contrasts
with the more affective and interpersonal definitions attached to instruments authored by other
groups.
The SIHS is a single-factor instrument in both short and long form, though Hoyle et al.
(2016) describe intellectual humility as involving three component aspects and structured the
final scale to include three items per aspect. The brief form of three items is comprised of the
strongest-loading item reflecting each aspect: “My views about _______ today may someday
turn out to be wrong,”; “When it comes to my views about _______ I may be overlooking
evidence.”; and “My views about _______ may change with additional evidence or information.”
Given the goal of functioning as an intellectual humility measure across subject matter domains,
tests of measurement invariance across topic were conducted with results supporting the claim of
invariant measurement across topics. Cronbach’s alpha values reported ranged from .88 to .96
for the full 9-item scale across multiple topics in 14 administrations to two samples and from .77
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to .88 for the 3-item version across multiple topics in 20 administrations to two samples. No tests
of temporal stability were reported.
Convergent evidence of validity was examined across many topics and by way of
multiple tests, and results are reported here in ranges if the range included at least one effect size
where |r| ≥ .30 (Hoyle et al., 2016). The predicted relationship with dogmatism was observed
and ranged in effect size from small (r = -.22) to large (r = -.53) across six topics. The
correlations between specific intellectual humility and general intellectual humility were small to
moderate for five of the six views (r = .24 to r = .43) and large for the sixth view (r = .63) with
narrower topics being less strongly related to GIHS than more general topics, suggesting that
SIHS is not only merely a reflection of GIHS. In a second study, the effect size for correlations
between specific and general intellectual humility across 12 views ranged from small to medium
(r = .09 to r = .36) and correlations among SIHS scores were generally more highly correlated
between related topics within the same domain than between topics in different domains. Some
observed results did not align fully with expectations. The predicted relationship with openness
was observed to be only modest (r = .11 to r = .21). Correlations between the SIHS and GIHS
were weak in the second study relative to the first study (r = .09 to r = .31), which the authors
suggested may be due to the GIHS being completed earlier in the day than the SIHS scales. The
second study also failed to find the predicted result that SIHS scores for more granular views
would be less strongly related to GIHS than SIHS for more general views.
In criterion-related tests of validity, the SIHS predicted more moderate levels of
agreement/disagreement with four issue-specific statements, with SIHS demonstrating a
curvilinear relationship such that both strong disagreement and strong agreement corresponded
with lower IH whereas moderate responses corresponded with higher levels of IH (Hoyle, 2016).
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The SIHS also showed criterion-related evidence of validity in that, as expected, scores predicted
some differences in the sources of information people credited for the basis of their viewpoints,
with endorsement of “information I learned based on my own exploration/study/research” being
related to SIHS for 8 of 12 topics (r = -.33 to r = -.23). Evidence of discriminant validity was
demonstrated by comparing the relationship between Dogmatism and SIHS. The authors
predicted that SIHS would show small to moderate correlations with Dogmatism, and results
showed correlations with effect sizes ranging from r = -.53 to r = -.22.
Commentary on Evidence for the Specific Intellectual Humility Scale.
The SIHS shares similar strengths as the GIHS with respect to the supporting theory and
the factor structure. Tests of measurement invariance across topics are also appreciated as part of
pursuing a higher standard for psychometric evidence. In addition to these strengths, the most
noteworthy feature of the SIHS is the attempt to measure topic-specific intellectual humility
rather than intellectual humility as a global trait. This is a promising avenue of research given
evidence from epistemic cognition research that there may not be a domain-general cognitive
sophistication with respect to the justification and revision of beliefs.
For instruments targeting a global disposition to be open or receptive to evidence, the
primary threat to validity is that global evaluations will reflect values more than actual
disposition. However, in applying similar items to assessing intellectual humility about specific
topics, the primary threat to validity is conflating intellectual humility with low interest and
investment in the topic, and it is not clear that results from testing for the SIHS reflect more than
the presence or absence of strongly held beliefs on a topic. Because it is generally appropriate for
strongly held beliefs to be less open to revision (Oaksford & Chater, 2009), it makes sense to
rule out the possibility of low investment in a belief before concluding that willingness to revise
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a belief is a sign of intellectual humility, but strength of prior belief was not controlled for in
these studies.
Results from the study on information sources cited as the basis for holding specific
beliefs further support this alternate interpretation. Reporting that views were partly based on
personal investigation (doing research, seeking information) was inversely related with SIHS.
This seems strongly counter to expectations of intellectual humility because intellectual humility
should be positively associated with seeking information as part of forming a belief about
substantive issues. However, such a result is consistent with interpreting high scores on the SIHS
as reflecting indifference, ignorance, or low importance of a topic.
Further supporting the importance of this limitation, subsequent research has shown that
the SIHS unexpectedly predicted results inconsistent with intellectual humility yet consistent
with interpreting the SIHS of reflecting strength of belief (Jankowski et al., 2019). Furthermore,
a study investigating the effect of SIHS (religion) scores on comfort with participating in a
diverse religious group showed that high SIHS scores were negatively associated with endorsing
religion as intrinsically important while also being predictive of greater openness to religious
diversity (Zhang et al., 2018). Again, this finding is consistent with interpreting the SIHS as
reflecting openness through a lesser investment in the subject rather than as an openness that
would be characteristic of intellectual humility. Altogether, it is unclear that SIHS can be
interpreted as reflecting intellectual humility about an issue unless there is a strong form of
control on belief commitment, strength of belief, belief importance, and other similar
considerations.
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Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale
The Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale (CIHS; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse,
2016) is a 22-item self-report instrument in which responses follow a 5-point Likert-like scale (1
= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). For the CIHS, intellectual humility is defined as “a
nonthreatening awareness of one’s intellectual fallibility” and is further described as involving
“openness to revising one’s viewpoints, lack of overconfidence about one’s knowledge, respect
for the viewpoints of others, and lack of threat in the face of intellectual disagreements”
(Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, p. 210). As suggested by the descriptor of comprehensive in the
instrument name, the CIHS conceptualization and resulting item content are broad in their
content coverage, encompassing interpersonal and intrapersonal qualities and describing social
as well as epistemic dispositions, and spanning the modesty and accuracy aspects of intellectual
humility.
The CIHS (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016) was designed to be multi-dimensional in
conjunction with the authors’ conceptualization of IH, and factor analysis additionally supported
the existence of four subscales: (a) Independence of Intellect and Ego (“I feel small when others
disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart”), (b) Openness to Revising One’s
Viewpoint (“I am open to revising my important beliefs in the face of new information”), (c)
Respect for Others’ Viewpoints (“I can respect others, even if I disagree with them in important
ways”), and (d) Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence (“For the most part, others have more to
learn from me than I have to learn from them”). Confirmatory factor analysis in the original
validation paper showed that total scores most strongly reflect Respect for Others’ Viewpoints
(factor loading = .988), followed by Openness to Revising One’s Viewpoint (factor loading =
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.794), then by Independence of Intellect and Ego (factor loading = .487), and finally by Lack of
Intellectual Overconfidence (factor loading = .372).
Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from .82 to .88 across four samples. Scores from the
CIHS were predicted to be moderately stable over time, and consistent with that prediction, testretest correlations were found to be .75 after one month and .70 after three months for the full
scale. Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) noted that test-retest correlations were below
recommended standards for the subscales at both time points and for the full scale at the 3-month
time period.
The CIHS showed convergent evidence of validity in correlations with the Openness and
Arrogance subscales of the Intellectual Humility Scale (McElory et al., 2014) modified for selfreport (r = .52 and r = -.53, respectively) and in showing the predicted positive yet more modest
correlation with measures of general humility, including two aspects of dispositional humility:
self-correction (r = .42) and accurate self-perspective (r = .30). Additional convergent evidence
was found in the observed predicted relationships with open-minded thinking (r = .56) and
openness to experience (r = .40).
The CIHS showed criterion-related evidence of validity in predicting open-minded
thinking beyond the variance explained by social desirability and measures of IH together and, in
a separate analysis, beyond measures of social desirability and general humility together. The
CIHS also significantly predicted openness to experience when controlling for social desirability
and individualism and predicted open-minded thinking and tolerance when controlling for selfreported desire to engage in cognitive complexity (understand diverse areas of knowledge,
synthesize ideas, and engage in logical thinking). The CIHS showed discriminant evidence of
validity in the lack observing a significant correlation with self-regard, in showing a small
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positive correlation with self-confidence, in showing no relationship with social conformity, and
in only a small correlation being observed for social desirability. Additionally, the CIHS was
shown to be less strongly predictive of narcissism and psychological entitlement than were
measures of general humility, providing further evidence that the measure reflects a quality
distinct from general humility and does so in ways expected by theory (Krumrei-Mancuso &
Rouse, 2016).
Commentary on Evidence for the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale
The most compelling evidence in support of the CIHS are the observed correlations with
actively open-minded thinking (AOT) and that the CIHS demonstrates a relationship with AOT
while also showing overlap with measures of humility, suggesting it reflects an attribute that is
more interpersonal than AOT alone. However, given that additive effects were not demonstrated
across factors, this suggests the CIHS may be reflecting multiple attributes rather than a trait that
is connected to both AOT and humility. Furthermore, though the correlation with AOT is
certainly in line with what one would hope for from an intellectual humility measure, the
evidentiary value of those correlations is qualified by the relative lack of risk in the predictions—
items on the more cognitive subscales on the CIHS are highly similar to items on the AOT
measure and items on the interpersonal subscales are highly similar to general humility
measures. Though the CIHS was shown to predict some outcomes better than a measure of
general humility, what remains to be explored is whether the CIHS can account for distinctly IHrelevant outcomes better than the AOT or a subset of AOT questions. Establishing this requires
not only more precisely exploring the theoretical and conceptual overlap and departures from IH
and constructs like AOT but also considering how to test the CIHS in a way that probes for those
differences. Additionally, because AOT measures explicitly do not measure thinking but instead

27
reflect valuing a type of thinking (Baron, 2017), associations with AOT measure scores are not
useful for addressing the central threat to validity of scores reflecting merely valuing intellectual
humility.
In subsequent publications, additional evidence pertaining to the qualities of the CIHS
has been reported, allowing for further consideration of these issues identified in initial validity
testing. The CIHS has been shown to be favorably associated with a variety of other cognitive
constructs including general knowledge, reflective cognition, lower overclaiming, need for
cognition, curiosity, and intellectual engagement (Krumrei-Mancuso et al., 2019). Once again,
however, these results were not compared against other measures likely to produce comparably
favorable results, such as AOT. Furthermore, though similar findings were reported elsewhere
for cognitive flexibility and intelligence (Zmigrod et al., 2019), the effect was noted to have not
been observed for the more identity-related subscales, again raising the question of whether the
favorable evidence for the CIHS results from intellectual humility or from the overlap with AOT
at the subscale level. Furthermore, the correlations with the CIHS for cognitive flexibility and
intelligence were not additive. Whereas either cognitive flexibility or intellectual ability was
enough to result in endorsement of the cognitive subscales of the CIHS, both together did not
lead to an even higher score. Zmigrod et al. (2019) concluded from this that either intelligence or
cognitive flexibility may be adequate to facilitate intellectual humility. However, it is not clear
from either philosophical or psychological theory that intelligence alone facilitates intellectual
humility nor why it would fail to be additive with cognitive flexibility if it were to contribute to
intellectual humility. An alternative explanation based on a more conservative interpretation of
results is that either intellectual or cognitive strength can result in self-attribution of epistemic
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virtue. Under what conditions and to what degree self-report of intellectual humility corresponds
to behavioral indicators of intellectual humility remains an open question
Though research has shown that the CIHS is associated with other cognitive constructs
that promote or are associated with knowledge and accurate judgement, it is unclear that the
CIHS contributes to that cluster of constructs in ways that are distinctively characteristic of
intellectual humility. The candidate explanation of identity-related reservations about admitting
fallibility contributing to positive outcomes was not supported by the research reporting
subscale-level effects, and it remains plausible that people who are good at some cognitive tasks
care about and endorse being good at admitting to fallibility without necessarily being better at
doing so in challenging naturalistic contexts relevant to intellectual humility as a virtue. The
CIHS seems to be a promising instrument given its breadth of content and the observed favorable
relationships with other valuable cognitive constructs, so it is hoped that future research will
demonstrate that the CIHS predicts outcomes characteristic of intellectual humility better than
other relevant constructs (e.g., cognitive reflection, AOT, critical thinking ability). Until then, it
would be prudent to continue to consider that CIHS scores reflect values rather intellectual
humility with respect to accuracy-related outcomes.
Intellectual Humility Scale
The Intellectual Humility Scale is an informant-report measure consisting of 16 items
with responses arranged on a 5-point, Likert-like scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree). McElroy et al. (2014) conceptualized intellectual humility as a subdomain of humility as
a general trait: “Whereas humility refers to a variety of domains, intellectual humility (IH)
pertains to one’s knowledge or intellectual influence” (McElroy et al., p. 20). Of all the
conceptualizations of IH accompanying measures reviewed in this paper, the IHS
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conceptualization is distinctive in that it is aligned almost entirely with interpersonal rather than
intrapersonal qualities and with social rather than epistemic outcomes. McElroy et al. suggested,
for example, that a person’s intellectual humility should be most apparent in interpersonally
tense situations involving competing ideas, but they did not emphasize notions of epistemic
sophistication, in contrast to conceptualizations attached to most other measures with clearly
stated expectations for cognitive correlates (e.g., actively open-minded thinking, argument
evaluation, knowledge recognition) and/or epistemic outcomes (e.g., belief certainty, belief
justification, avoiding errant claims of knowledge).
Cronbach’s alpha values for the full IHS scale were .96 and .94 across two studies
(McElroy et al., 2014). Temporal stability was not tested. Factor analyses of the IHS suggested
and then confirmed the presence of two subscales consistent with the authors’ two-element
theoretical conceptualization: Intellectual Openness (e.g., “Seeks out alternative viewpoints”)
and a reverse-coded factor of Intellectual Arrogance (e.g., “Often becomes angry when their
ideas are not implemented”).
Convergent evidence of validity was demonstrated in that the IHS showed expected
relationships with how much the informant trusted the individual they were rating (r = .74),
perceived agreeableness (r = .78), perceived openness (r = .54), perceived conscientiousness (r =
.58), and perceived neuroticism (r = -.58). The scale also showed criterion-related evidence of
validity. In a separate study, participants were recruited who had recently experienced a betrayal
by a religious leader, and it was predicted that IHS ratings would differ in association with the
participants’ spiritual appraisals of the offense and that IHS ratings would additionally be
associated with unforgiveness toward the offender. As predicted by theory, IHS scores were
found to be related with attitudes toward God (positive attitudes, r = .31; anger r = -.35) and with
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forgiveness/unforgiveness dispositions (avoidance, r = -.54; benevolence motivations, r = .41).
The forgiveness/ unforgiveness disposition of revenge motivation was observed to be marginally
negatively related (r = -.21, p = .054). Contrary to predictions, however, there was no
relationship between IHS ratings and viewing the offense as a desecration (McElroy et al, 2014).
The IHS showed discriminant evidence of validity with respect to modesty and drive.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions and asked to think of someone who
either most exemplifies or least exemplifies one of three virtuous qualities: intellectual humility,
modesty, or drive. These qualities were not defined for participants. Participants in all conditions
then provided IHS ratings for their chosen individual. IHS scores were more strongly related to
the condition in which participants thought of someone who exemplified IH than to the
conditions involving people exemplifying modesty or drive and furthermore clearly
distinguished between those individuals thought of as exemplifying IH and those exemplifying
drive. McElroy et al. (2014) also included additional criterion-related evidence of validity in that
the IHS was strongly predictive of individuals thought to be strong rather than weak in IH.
Commentary on the Evidence for the Intellectual Humility Scale
Though correlations with informant ratings of broad personality constructs were as
predicted, some of these relationships were so large as to raise the question of whether the IHS is
markedly different in the context of experiencing a religious offense from other favorable
character evaluations such as general humility or agreeableness. In the same way, the specific
predictions made for perceptions of IH for a religious leader who had betrayed trust would seem
just as reasonable as predictions for agreeableness or most any positive character judgement –
the more injurious the offense, the less favorably the offender will be viewed.
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The prediction involving forgiveness disposition, on the other hand, does seem more
obviously relevant to McElroy et al.’s (2014) conceptualization of intellectual humility – it
makes sense that someone perceived as more open to other points of view would engender
greater forgiveness with all else being equal. However, because there is no comparison provided
with how other perceived traits predict forgiveness, it is not clear that the findings in the study
substantiate IHS scores as being more predictive of forgiveness than other pro-social traits not
specifically associated with openness to other ideas, such as agreeableness.
These concerns notwithstanding, the face validity of items and factor analytic evidence
supporting scale construction suggest that the scale would likely be specifically sensitive to cases
where a person was generally agreeable but intellectually defensive. What is less clear is if this
scale would generally be sensitive to the opposite case of someone who is disagreeable overall
yet fair-minded and open about ideas. This is as much a challenge for informant report in general
as it is for the IHS in particular (Funder, 2012). Informant report instruments including the IHS
will be more interpretable as reflective of trait IH when the informant is positioned to observe the
target individual in situations that strain intellectual humility. The less experience the informant
has with the target in such situations, the more IHS scores could be expected to converge with
more general perceptions of character.
Finally, it is not clear that the setup for the validity studies strain IH as much as might be
suggested by the factors involved in a religious offense by a leader. Though McElroy et al.
(2014) correctly pointed out that conflict over important values and ideas will strain IH, it is less
clear that a religious leader committing an offense primarily represents a conflict of ideas
between that leader and others so much as a violation of moral standards. Additionally, though
the definition of intellectual humility provided by McElroy et al. describes accurate self-
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awareness of intellectual strengths and weaknesses, the scale itself overwhelmingly describes
openness to the perspective of others, which one would expect to be related to but not identical
with self-awareness of intellectual limitations. Furthermore, social openness about differing ideas
is not the same thing as intellectual openness to differing ideas. The IHS is at minimum a
compelling instrument for use in situations where an informant has specific experience with the
target in situations that uniquely strain the target’s intellectual humility yet enough distance from
the context of the assessment to maintain objectivity.
The Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale
The Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale (LOIHS; Haggard et al., 2018) is a
12-item self-report instrument with responses arranged on a 9-point Likert-like scale (1 =
strongly disagree; 9 = strongly agree). Haggard et al. (2018) anchored their instrument in the
limitations-owning account of intellectual humility (Whitcomb et al., 2017). The limitationsowning account of IH provides a rich and detailed conceptual framework for a practical account
of intellectual humility as a psychological trait. By explicitly aligning with this framework, the
LOIHS is aligning itself with a more conceptually rich and specific account of IH than some
predecessors. Haggard et al. concisely summarized the definition of IH in the limitations-owning
account as “owning one’s intellectual limitations while being appropriately attentive to them”
and explained that being IH involves “affective, motivational, behavioral, and cognitive
dispositions” that lead to having accurate beliefs about one’s own intellectual limitations and
also lead to feeling, acting, and being motivated in “certain ways in certain circumstances”
(Haggard et al., 2018, p. 185).
In collaboration with other scholars, Haggard et al. (2018) identified three essential
components of intellectual humility: (a) owning one’s intellectual limitations, (b) love of
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learning, and (c) appropriate discomfort with one’s own intellectual limits. Factor analyses
supported the final scale being reflective of these three theory-informed factors that guided
development: Love of Learning (“When I don’t understand something, I try hard to figure it
out”), Appropriate Discomfort with Limitations (“When I think about the limitations of what I
know, I feel uncomfortable”), and Owning Intellectual Limitations (“When someone points out a
mistake in my thinking, I am quick to admit that I was wrong”). Cronbach’s alpha values of .86
and .87 were reported in two samples. The test-retest correlation for the full-scale score was .75
after five months.
The LOIHS showed convergent evidence of validity in its relationship with other
measures of intellectual humility, including the CIHS (r = .52) and the GIHS (r = .43) and also in
correlations with agreeableness (r = .46), conscientiousness (r = .49), and neuroticism (r = -.48).
Additional convergent evidence of validity was obtained by way of secondary factor analysis of
all included measures of intellectual humility that showed them loading on a single factor
(though goodness of fit statistics for the model were not reported). Criterion-related evidence
was found in strong relationships with closed-mindedness (r = -.48), assertiveness (r = .43), and
authentic pride (r = .41), and smaller effects consistent with theory were observed for dogmatism
(r = -.23) and hubristic pride (-.26). However, some results differed from expectations in ways
that were noted as potentially concerning. First, one quality highlighted as a likely associate of
intellectual humility in the Whitcomb et al. (2017) paper is reflective thinking, yet the LOIHS
was unrelated to a measure of cognitive reflection. Second, a surprisingly large positive
correlation was observed between LOIHS scores and the Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale
of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (r = .49; BIDR; Paulhus, 1988).
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Discriminant evidence of validity was found in the lack of observed relationships between
LOIHS scores and general religiousness, social vigilantism, participant age, and participant sex.
Commentary on the Evidence for the Limitations Owning Intellectual Humility Scale
The primary strength of the LOIHS is its full commitment to the limitations-owning
account from Whitcomb et al. (2017), which includes a clear account for how intellectual
humility is expected to be related to other qualities and which of those qualities are more central
to the trait and which are more distally related. Alignment between LOIHS scores and the
Whitcomb et al. (2017) paper thus provides numerous specific, testable claims for whether the
measure is functioning as would be expected.
Evidence supporting the LOIHS consists of correlations with a variety of self-report trait
measures and with one form of direct observational evidence. The direct observational evidence
is the association with scores from the cognitive reflection task, which is clearly related to the
limitations-owning account of intellectual humility. Though two of the three LOIHS subscales
showed positive correlations with cognitive reflection, these correlations were small and were
not apparent at the level of the full-scale score. With respect to the associations with other trait
measures, the sizable positive correlation with self-deceptive enhancement suggests that LOIHS
scores may be susceptible to reporting overly positive accounts of themselves. If so, the subset of
people endorsing LOIHS items without warrant may be the reason for the weak association with
cognitive reflection.
In total, the LOIHS demonstrates similar associations with other traits as seen across
measures of intellectual humility that include the epistemic aspects of its conceptualization.
Inclusion of a test of cognitive reflection provided an opportunity for a relatively clear
demonstration of evidence consistent with the proposed interpretation of scores, but the results
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from that test were not clearly favorable. Similarly, the selection of a more sophisticated measure
of desirable responding is a commendable choice for obtaining clearer validity evidence. Results
from that test, however, raise concerns about the influence of general self-enhancement bias on
scores, in addition to potential problems with awareness of limitations that are the subject of this
review. Additional evidence is generally needed for how LOIHS scores can be interpreted.
The Cultural Humility Scale
The Cultural Humility Scale (CHS; Hook et al., 2013) is an instrument designed and
named in conjunction with a different humility-related construct—cultural humility, yet it has
subsequently been modified for use in multiple studies as a measure of intellectual humility
(Hook et al., 2015). Because it is used as a measure of intellectual humility and has a published
validation study, it was included for this review. Even in its unmodified form, the CHS targets a
conceptualization of cultural humility that closely aligns with notions of intellectual humility
seen in some of the other reviewed measures here. Hook et al. describe cultural humility as seen
in the extent to which someone can “strive to be effective but also cultivate a growing awareness
that they are inevitably limited in their knowledge and understanding of a client’s cultural
background” (2013, p. 2). Though the original form of the CHS is supported by validity studies
and a validity argument, the modified version has not been separately evaluated for its validity as
a measure of intellectual humility (Hook et al. 2015). The validity evidence reported here
therefore pertains to the original, unmodified scale.
The CHS demonstrated criterion-related evidence of validity by predicting more
favorable perceptions of the working relationship between the respondent and their
psychotherapist, the argument being that awareness of having limited knowledge and
understanding of other cultures would result in more positive therapy relationships (Hook et al.
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2013). In a hierarchical regression analysis, this was observed in the case of retrospective and
contemporaneous reports about the therapy relationship in different populations, and the variance
accounted for remained significant after controlling for the perceived multicultural competence
of the therapist. The CHS was not tested for convergent evidence or discriminant evidence of
validity.
Commentary on the Cultural Humility Scale
Though the CHS as a measure of intellectual humility is not supported by a formal
validity argument, it has seen repeated use in published research as a flexible stem for measuring
various subdomains of humility, use that is largely driven by the research activity of its authors.
Given that multiple measures have been developed that aim to specifically measure intellectual
humility and which were expressly validated for that purpose, the CHS would seem most clearly
suited to assessing intellectual humility about cultural matters, its originally intended purpose.
That said, a formal validity argument supporting the use of the item stems and a set of rules for
adapting the stems as a universally flexible humility subdomain measure could establish the
instrument as a strong candidate for assessment of the modesty aspect of intellectual humility,
both generally and with respect to specific subject matter.
Porter and Schumann Intellectual Humility Scale
The Porter and Schumann Intellectual Humility Scale (PSIHS; Porter & Schumann,
2018) is a 9-item measure with response choices on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree. The authors of the PSIHS define intellectual humility as “a
willingness to recognize the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciate others’ intellectual
strengths” (Porter & Schumann, 2018, p. 140). This is an original conceptualization that bridges
both the modesty and accuracy aspects of intellectual humility. The PSIHS is comprised of six
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positively worded (“I am willing to admit it if I don’t know something”) and three negatively
worded (“I feel uncomfortable when someone points out one of my intellectual shortcomings”)
items reflecting a single factor when accounting for negatively and positively worded items
(Porter & Schumann, 2018, p. 143). Cronbach’s alpha values across four studies were reported as
an average of .74. No tests of temporal stability were reported.
The PSIHS showed convergent evidence of validity in relationships with general humility
(r = .42), agreeableness (r = .35 to r = .41), growth mindset (r = .23 to r = .42), openness to
experience (r = .40), need for cognition (r = .40), modesty (r = .31), learning goals (r = .44) and
conscientiousness (r = .30). Scores were also positively correlated, as expected, with need for
cognition, openness to experience, and epistemic curiosity, though effect sizes were small.
Contrary to expectations, PSIHS scores were not significantly associated with need for cognitive
closure or with narcissism. In criterion-related tests of validity, PSIHS scores were associated
with attributing respectful intent in a scenario describing a classroom disagreement (r = .40) and
reporting greater openness to a dissenter in a scenario involving a disagreement outside of class
(r = .48). A second study demonstrated similar results when the scenario involved a discussion
with someone holding the opposite view about an important socio-political issue, and PSIHS
scores were again associated with respectful attributions about the disagreement (r = .34) and
greater openness to learning about the opposing perspective (r = .33). In a third study, PSIHS
scores were associated with a greater preference for spending time reading about an opposing
view rather than a congenial view (r = .16 to r = .29). Across these studies, PSIHS scores
remained a significant predictor of these outcomes when controlling for relevant other study
variables. The PSIHS showed discriminant evidence of validity in no association with selfesteem, confidence in intelligence, or gender. Though age was significantly correlated with
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PSIHS scores in two of the four studies, controlling for age in analyses did not alter results.
Socially desirable responding was also not associated with PSIHS scores, though this was tested
only in the preliminary evaluation of the instrument’s factor structure and not in the studies
reported in the paper.
Commentary on Evidence for the Porter and Schumann Intellectual Humility Scale.
The primary strength of the PSIHS is that it is supported by multiple behavioral
observations along a core theme that is clearly related to intellectual humility — openness to an
opposing view. The most direct supporting evidence of this claim is the finding that PSIHS
scores were associated with more time spent reading about information pertaining to an opposing
view. This finding was supported by the observations of scores being associated with more
favorable attributions about a disagreement and greater self-reported openness to the opposing
view in response to two different presented scenarios. As to the strength of this evidence with
respect to the core threat to validity, these observations could be attributed to intellectual
humility but could also be attributed to qualities associated with merely valuing intellectual
humility. Whether this behavior among high scorers is taken as evidence of intellectual humility
depends upon the motivation for engaging the opposing information and the manner in which
that information was engaged.
While the authors argue against the idea that those scoring highly on their measure are
surveying opposing views to derogate them, an alternate possibility is that reading about
opposing views is simply more interesting than reading information that is already familiar for
someone who is curious and motivated to learn. Scores were also unassociated with choosing not
to engage in the reading task at all, which contrasts somewhat with the expectation of willingness
to engage an opposing view included in the definition attached to the measure. The finding that
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attitude strength and issue knowledge remained unchanged after reading opposing views is not
necessary evidence against intellectual humility being responsible, but those findings are
inconsistent with the kind of engagement that would clearly constitute a display of intellectual
humility—considering seriously the possibility of being at least partly wrong, engaging with an
opposed opinion to become more informed, and revising beliefs or belief confidence
accordingly—even when doing so would strain intellectual humility (e.g., during a heated
argument).
Altogether, the PSIHS has shown evidence that is consistent with intellectual humility
but which is also attributable to valuing intellectual humility. Similar studies including other
indicators of the way in which information is engaged and a context making engaging opposing
information meaningfully difficult could provide clearer evidence of intellectual humility. Even
then, it is worth noting that none of the philosophical accounts of intellectual humility have
aligned completely with even virtuous open-mindedness, and open-mindedness alone can even
be a sign of a lack of appropriate confidence in beliefs. For the PSIHS to function as a measure
of intellectual humility, in addition to clearer evidence that scores predict a virtuous form of
open-mindedness characteristic of intellectual humility, a stronger argument for the centrality of
open-mindedness to intellectual humility would need to be made or additional evidence
demonstrating broader domain coverage would need to be provided.
Alfano Multi-Dimensional Intellectual Humility Scale
The Alfano Multi-Dimensional Intellectual Humility Scale (AMIHS; Alfano et al., 2017)
is a 22-item measure with response choices on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. Rather than providing a definition of IH, the authors of the AMIHS surveyed
several definitions from philosophy and psychology with the intent of developing an instrument
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to broadly cover content across the range of conceptualizations. They summarize the range of
conceptualizations by describing IH as “a multi-faceted disposition that directs cognition,
emotion, and behavior both in social contexts and in solitary inquiry” (Alfano et al., 2017, pp. 25).
The AMIHS was designed to be multi-dimensional to reflect theory, and the final scale is
comprised of four factors supported by CFA: (a) Open-Mindedness (If I do not know much
about some topic, I don’t mind being taught about it, even if I know about other topics), (b)
Intellectual Modesty (I like to be the smartest person in the room [reversed]), (c) Corrigibility (If
someone points out an intellectual mistake that I’ve made, I tend to get angry [reversed]), and (d)
Engagement (I find it boring to discuss things I don’t already understand [reversed]; Alfano et al,
2017). In lieu of providing Cronbach’s alpha values, the authors presented the results of analyses
in the item response theory framework. No tests of temporal stability were reported.
The AMIHS showed convergent evidence of validity in associations between self- and
informant-report for each subscale. The strongest correlation between self- and informant-report
was for Intellectual Modesty (r = .47). The Open-Mindedness (r = .34), Corrigibility (r = .29)
and Engagement (r = .28) subscales showed lesser agreement between self and informant, which
the authors noted as lower than typical for personality measures yet to be expected for IH given
the largely internal nature of the construct. Additional convergent evidence of validity was
demonstrated at the subscale level. As predicted, the Open-Mindedness subscale was negatively
related to narcissism (r = -.09) and overclaiming bias (r = -.16), and the Modesty subscale was
negatively related to narcissism (r = -.40) and overclaiming bias (r = -.09). The Engagement
subscale was positively associated with grit, as predicted (r = .25). Associations with self-
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deceptive enhancement and impression management were noted as larger than hoped, and
AMIHS subscales correlated more broadly with other constructs than expected.
In a test of criterion-related validity, the Open-Mindedness subscale was tested for its
ability to predict overclaiming bias above and beyond personality traits. In a full regression
model including Open-Mindedness and all six Big Six personality traits, open-mindedness was
most predictive of overclaiming bias. The AMIHS showed discriminant evidence of validity in
not showing too large of an effect in bivariate relationships with other study variables and in
demonstrating unique predictive value when included in regression analyses with other study
variables.
Commentary on Evidence for the Alfano Multi-Dimensional Intellectual Humility Scale.
The AMIHS is supported by one of the most thorough considerations of measurement
validity accompanying any measure of intellectual humility — a substantial contribution to
theory, testing the instrument with multiple strong forms of evidence, specific predictions for
observations, and open acknowledgment of failed predictions. The authors make a compelling
argument that intellectual humility as a psychological construct consists of at least four
dimensions by reviewing major philosophical accounts for psychological characteristics. This
approach builds upon the conceptual rigor of specific philosophical accounts, attends to the
breadth of the construct as discussed in psychology, and identifies psychological factors that
could plausibly promote a disposition aligned with the broad expectations of intellectual
humility. In addition to important theoretical work, the authors also advance the measurement of
intellectual humility in addressing whether the items function well at different levels of the target
construct, which seems especially important in the study of a virtue.
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With respect to the central threat to validity of how scores are to be interpreted,
supporting evidence consists of informant-report, correlations with other self-report trait
measures, and direct observation of qualities associated with intellectual humility. Informants
generally had long-term familiarity with the participant but there were only one or two
informants for all but one participant, in contrast to some group-based studies of perceptions of
intellectual humility that have been conducted with other measures. The modest correlations
between informant report and self-report for most dimensions are not concerning for the reasons
given by the authors — the processes described are mostly internal and there may be different
interpretations of items as well — but these reasons also preclude global informant report from
being strong evidence of validity for any factor other than the Modesty factor. With respect to
the modest agreement between self and informant report on the more internal factors, one would
expect valuing intellectual humility to be the predominant factor contributing to global
evaluations from others, with qualities such as anti-intellectualism, dogmatism, or self-avowed
stubbornness being most likely to show clearly in both self-report and informant report.
Additionally, informant reports were on average less favorable than self-reports for all
dimensions, and this difference was statistically significant for the Open-Mindedness and
Engagement subscales.
The direct observational evidence provided is a negative correlation between selfreported open-mindedness and overclaiming bias. It is not obvious that merely valuing
intellectual humility would protect against overly confident meta-cognitive assessments about
knowledge or to predict a lesser likelihood of over-representing one’s knowledge. With respect
to its relevance to the central threat to validity, this is a strong form of evidence in favor of the
proposed interpretation of scores for the Open-Mindedness subscale. However, the simultaneous
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finding that scores from the Open-Mindedness subscale were positively correlated with selfdeceptive enhancement to an even greater degree highlights the difficulty of interpreting
evidence of one dimension of intellectual humility as evidence of all dimensions of intellectual
humility. One of the most interesting features of intellectual humility as a construct in contrast to
other forms of cognitive sophistication is that intellectual humility involves a tension between
remarkable cognitive strengths and the absence of arrogance or egotism about those strengths.
Ideally a measure of intellectual humility will be able to show these qualities simultaneously.
Though correlation with other trait measures is not generally a strong form of evidence,
the authors provided specific theory-informed predictions, allowing for the possibility of a
relatively stronger demonstration of validity evidence should results match those predictions.
Significant departures from predictions, however, resulted in evidence that is not especially
informative for addressing the core threat to validity. Correlational evidence was mixed in that it
included broad correlations with personality and two forms of desirable responding. The
possibility of significant self-report bias seems plausible given the total picture of evidence. In
addition to these mixed findings, there are important gaps in criterion-related evidence showing
that the instrument is predictive of distinctively IH outcomes or exemplars. Given the many
conceptual strengths of this instrument and a promising finding with respect to overclaiming, the
AMIHS likely warrants further study to determine its potential as a measure of intellectual
humility.
Theistic Intellectual Humility Scale
The Theistic Intellectual Humility Scale (TIHS; Hill et al., 2021) is an 11-item scale with
response choices on a 6-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The TIHS
was developed to assess intellectual humility as it might be understood and experienced by
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Christians. The TIHS is conceptually rooted in the philosophy of Augustine, with theistic IH
being characterized as “a glad intellectual dependence on God” (Hill et al., 2018, p. 198). This
conceptualization of IH differs from others in that it is grounded in a particular religious tradition
and is intended for use with members of that faith. The conceptualization shares general features
with other IH conceptualizations in that it encompasses both cognitive and intra-/interpersonal
content, though these conceptualizations are markedly different in specific content due to being
couched within a “Christian grammar” (Hill et al., 2018).
The TIHS is a three-factor instrument: (a) Intellectual Submission to the Divine (“I try to
submit all my intellectual efforts to God”), (b) Human Finite Limitations (“I don’t need to know
everything because God is in control”), and (c) Belief Bias and Limitations (“There are some
aspects of my Christian beliefs that I am very confident in, and others that I’m less confident in”;
Hill et al., 2021, p. 157). Cronbach’s alpha values reported ranged from .83 to .85 across three
samples. No tests of temporal stability were reported.
The TIHS showed convergent evidence of validity in full-score and subscale-level
associations with a number of conceptually related measures. Human Finite Limitations was
shown to be positively related to conscientiousness (r = .33) and negatively related to hubristic
pride (r = -.33). Belief Bias and Limitations was positively associated with need for cognition (r
= .31). In a test for criterion-related evidence, the TIHS was shown to moderate the relationship
between religious commitment and four of five indicators of well-being such that religious
commitment had a more favorable influence on well-being when TIHS scores were higher. A
positive influence of religious commitment depended upon or was potentiated by higher TIHS
scores for flourishing, ultimate meaning, depressive symptoms, and anxiety symptoms. In every
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case, this moderation effect was due to either the Intellectual Submission to the Divine subscale
or the Human Finite Limitations subscale and not the Belief Bias Limitations subscale.
Discriminant evidence of validity was shown in small to moderate correlations between
full scores and subscale-level scores with other IH measures. Additionally, TIHS full scale
scores were shown to be unrelated to extraversion and unrelated to social vigilantism. Though
subscales were also expected to show the same lack of association, there was a small negative
relationship shown between Belief Bias and Limitations and extraversion (r = -.12) and a small
positive association between social vigilantism and Intellectual Submission to the Divine (r =
.17).
Commentary on Evidence for the Theistic Intellectual Humility Scale.
The TIHS is unique in aligning with a religious and historical account of intellectual
humility rather than a contemporary philosophical account. In doing so, the TIHS places debates
about the relationship of religious belief to intellectual humility at the center of the
conceptualization and highlights important theoretical considerations for measurement of
intellectual humility in general. How does culture affect intellectual humility and its
measurement? How are accuracy accounts of intellectual humility to account for religious belief?
On the subdomain account of intellectual humility (aligned with the modesty aspect), it would
seem that lesser self-focus and low concern for correctness might be compatible with a diversity
of ideas about knowledge depending on cultural context and cultural ideas about the nature of
truth. Consideration of diversity in ideas about knowledge has relevance far beyond religion,
however, including openness to other ways of knowing, and instruments that align solely with
strongly empirical ideas about knowledge and the accuracy aspect may be challenged not only by
religious and spiritual accounts of truth but by more aesthetic and emotional accounts as well.
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The validity evidence provided for the TIHS takes the form of associations with other
trait measures, and overall evidence supporting the accuracy-related subscale is weak as a result.
However, it is not clear that the accuracy-related aspect of the measure is central to the goals of
how the instrument should be interpreted and used. If the primary purpose is to assess intellectual
humility within a Christian grammar of submission to God in intellectual matters, secular
conceptualizations of owning epistemic limitations may not be as relevant to the crux of the
construct, especially with for the subjective wellbeing criterion focused on by Hill et al. (2021).
Consistent with this idea, evidence for the TIHS suggests that scores at minimum reflect a sense
of comfort and coherence about intellectual limitations from a particular Christian tradition, and
that this comfort is related to subjective reports of wellbeing. The lack of involvement from the
factor of the scale that reflects the secular notions of owning limitations, however, indicates that
theistic intellectual humility may not entail comfort with intellectual limitations in the general
sense expected by other accounts. If TIHS scores are intended to reflect comfort with a distinctly
Christian notion of intellectual humility, evidence supports it as being likely useful for that
purpose. To fully support the proposed interpretation of scores reflecting glad intellectual
dependence on God, however, this initial self-report evidence would need to be supported by
other forms of evidence including informant-report and relevant behavioral evidence. A
particular limitation of the current evidence is that the broad spectrum of positive correlations
with desirable traits suggests that TIHS scores may be subject to social desirability effects, even
with respect to self-reported wellbeing.
If scores are also expected to function as a culturally responsive measure of intellectual
humility, additional evidence is required to demonstrate that the general expectations of
intellectual humility involving humble character and accurate awareness of intellectual
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limitations are reflected by scores. Studies attempting to link TIHS scores with evidence of
intellectual humility as conceptualized by contemporary philosophers will need to take into
account cultural considerations. Items that ask Christians directly about willingness to change
beliefs, for example, will likely run into identity-related confounds (Stanovich & Toplak, 2019).
Using science-related measures as evidence of intellectual humility will also need to be careful to
consider cultural elements (Kahan, 2015). Informant-report or coders judging behavior will need
to be familiar with cultural considerations along these lines because some statements that would
seem to lack intellectual humility (e.g., saying that no evidence can ever change a particular
belief) might be compatible with intellectual humility due to contextual factors, as has been
argued for some other examples of refusing to revise a belief for personal reasons (Church &
Samuelson, 2017, pp. 21-22). It is also important to note that these cultural considerations are
applicable to any measure of intellectual humility when used with populations that include
religious people.
State-Trait Intellectual Humility Scale
The State-Trait Intellectual Humility Scale (STIHS; Zachry et al., 2018) is an 11-item
measure with response choices on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree. The instrument was developed to assess “core features of IH at both the state and trait
level and in daily life” using the same item set and to achieve broad content coverage (Zachry et
al., 2018, p. 1408). The authors of the STIHS align their instrument with the limitations-owning
account of Whitcomb et al. (2017) while expanding item content to capture aspects of daily life,
and they characterize intellectual humility as “a proper awareness of and attentiveness to
intellectual limitations” (Zachry et al., 2018, p. 1408).
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The STIHS is a unidimensional measure with item content describing a positive and
active relationship with challenging one’s ideas or having one’s ideas challenged by others (e.g.
“I search actively for reasons why my beliefs might be wrong”3). Cronbach’s alpha for the final
version of the trait measure was reported as .91. No tests of temporal stability were reported.
The trait version of the STIHS showed convergent evidence of validity in relationships
with a broad range of related constructs. In the pilot study with the pilot form of the trait version,
these included need for cognition (.47); attributes from the Moral Trait Scale including general
moral character (.31), honesty (.31), compassion (.32), and humility (.30); and attributes from the
Intellect Scale including overall scores (.66), think (.63), learn (.65), create (.57), seek (.63), and
conquor (.62). In the study with the final form of the trait measure, correlates included low
dogmatism (-.42); authentic pride (.30); several subscales of the HEXACO personality inventory
including Extraversion (.36), Agreeableness (.48), Conscientiousness (.31), Openness (.49), and
Altruism (.39); prestige (.33); existential quest (.36); epistemic curiosity (.48); low selfrighteousness (-.55); low need for closure (-.30); actively open-minded thinking (.56), and
tolerance from the Jackson Personality Inventory (.60).
In a demonstration of criterion-related validity, trait STIHS scores were correlated
positively with aggregated state measure scores (.47), though for this study, a coding error
caused two items to be excluded from the analysis, potentially altering the scale properties. The
state version of the measure was shown through experience sampling to predict more positive
evaluations of a self-selected challenging situation involving another person. The state version of
the scale was also shown to have a similar factor structure to the trait version, and this was
argued to show a link between trait scores and behavior. The STIHS showed discriminant
3

Item-factor correlations were not reported for this measure. As a result, this item was subjectively chosen as
representative rather than selected based on factor loading.
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evidence of validity in the lack of association with trait narcissism, emotionality, or
religious/spiritual beliefs. STIHS scores were also shown to be significantly predictive of
multiple relevant outcomes when entered in hierarchical regression analyses after a competing
measure of intellectual humility, and this was demonstrated against GIHS scores and again with
CIHS scores.
Commentary on Evidence for the State-Trait Intellectual Humility Scale.
A strength of the STIHS is that there are parallel forms of the instrument to assess both
state and trait intellectual humility. This allows for the use of situated experience sampling with
the same item set as is used for the trait measure, which provides a unique opportunity for
collecting validity evidence. This method has an advantage with respect to problems in the
response process compared to other methods in that it prevents someone high in intellectual
humility from recalling a relatively rare sort of event as a reason for self-rating with lower
scores, as might happen in a global self-evaluation. This paper is therefore a major contribution
to the measurement strategies available to intellectual humility researchers if for no other reason
than pointing toward a technique to protect against a portion of the threat to the response process,
yet for this review, the focus is on validity for the included trait measure and the evidence
supporting an interpretation of those scores as reflective of trait intellectual humility.
The primary form of validity evidence for the trait version of the STIHS comes in the
form of correlations with other trait measures. To the credit of the study authors, predictions
about these correlations were made with specificity and each prediction was provided with a
rationale, which substantially increases the potential value of such correlations if predictions are
realized with similar specificity. Results were mixed in aligning with predictions, however. The
STIHS was shown to correlate with a broad range of constructs including many that are relevant
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to intellectual humility and many others only loosely related to intellectual humility. In addition
to these correlations, STIHS scores showed sizable correlations with some theoretically
irrelevant constructs and small to medium-sized positive correlations with three forms of
desirable responding. Altogether, this pattern of correlations does not provide adequate
specificity for differentiating between intellectual humility and merely valuing intellectual
humility.
The relationship between trait scores and data from experience sampling was also
presented as validity evidence, but this evidence is difficult to interpret as validity evidence for
the trait measure for a few reasons. First, this form of evidence sits somewhere between direct
observation and correlation with another self-report trait measure. Though experience sampling
constrains the response process to specific events, it still relies on self-determination of what
constitutes a challenging event worth reporting and an accurate characterization of how one
responded to the event. Second, the validity argument for the state measure is difficult to
interpret. State measure scores were positively associated with favorable impressions of the other
person involved in the challenging event, lesser likelihood of perceiving the event as a
disagreement, and with more positive evaluations of the nature of the interaction. However, item
content for the state measure largely assumes the occurrence of a disagreement as a predicate
(e.g., “I reviewed the challenging of my ideas as an opportunity to grow”, “I complimented the
ideas of those who disagreed with me”). It is not clear how responses to many of the items
should be interpreted during interactions that are not disagreements, and it is also not clear how
to interpret some items in the context of a more emotional form of conflict, such as a heated
argument with a spouse about a frequent point of conflict (e.g., “I was easily convinced to adopt
new attitudes or beliefs”, “I enjoyed trying to make sense of conflicted information”). Finally, it
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is not apparent that the similar factor structure of the trait and state versions of the scale
establishes a link from self-report of the trait to behavioral evidence of the trait, as it seems is
claimed in the paper. A situated self-report is not a behavioral observation, and even if it were, a
similar factor structure does not allow for validity evidence pertaining to one latent variable to
extend to the other. Demonstrating correlations between trait measure scores and the aggregated
scores from the state measure version of the instrument suggests some stability in how people
respond to items of this kind, but it is unclear that this shared variance is attributable to
intellectual humility.
In total, while the large correlations with intellect, open-minded thinking, and similar
constructs suggest that scores indeed reflect valuing intellectual humility, the breadth of other
correlations and correlations with desirable responding make it difficult to interpret these results
with respect to the central threat to validity. The method of sampling from specific experiences
and aggregating those samples is a promising addition to the toolset of intellectual humility
researchers wanting to limit sources of error in measurement, but it seems that item content or
the instruction set might need to be refined so that the response process is interpretable for the
situations in which the state measurements occur. Furthermore, the application of that method in
this case is difficult to interpret as validity evidence for how the trait measures scores can be
interpreted. Altogether, there is not sufficient evidence to determine that STIHS trait scores
reflect intellectual humility rather than merely valuing intellectual humility. However,
aggregating state scores could be a promising strategy for investigating intellectual humility in
general and as an element of validation studies for trait measures of intellectual humility.
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Discussion
Despite being a relatively young area of study, the systematic search revealed the
existence of 15 questionnaire measures of trait intellectual humility. After excluding measures
lacking a published validation study, 10 measures remained and were included for review. As to
the primary focus of the review, validity evidence for each measure was critically evaluated in
terms of the definition and theory presented by each author team and with a focus on the primary
threat to validity of self-report potentially reflecting merely valuing intellectual humility more
than intellectual humility.
One measure, the IHS, differed from all others in both methodology (informant- vs selfreport) and in conceptualization (interpersonal vs intrapersonal/cognitive). The IHS thus had the
more modest goal of reflecting judgements of other people as generally intellectually open and
lacking arrogance. Though the IHS had its own problems of not sufficiently demonstrating that
other-appraisals of IH are distinct from appraisals of general humility and general agreeableness,
the instrument nevertheless seems suitable for use as an assessment of the more interpersonal
conceptualization of intellectual humility as a subdomain of general humility conceptualized as a
character judgement. Scores from multiple informants when informants are able to evaluate the
individual across multiple opportunities for displaying IH may be able to provide a general
judgement of how the person is experienced by others who know them well. Even given the
expressly interpersonal conceptualization of IH featured in their definition, McElroy et al. (2014)
nevertheless included greater likelihood of holding evidence-based beliefs in their descriptions of
IH, and because this was not demonstrated, additional validity is still needed for the IHS if it is to
extend beyond interpersonal perceptions to reflecting the disposition of the target being rated.
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The remaining nine measures are in the form of a self-report instrument purported to
assess intellectual humility as a dispositional trait, with one of those measures having an
accompanying state measure as well. One of these measures, the CHS, exclusively focused on
the modesty aspect of intellectual humility, and two, the GIHS an SIHS, focused exclusively on
the accuracy aspect of intellectual humility. The remaining measures included both the accuracy
and modesty aspects in the scale construction. Associations with other self-report measures
comprised the largest portion of validity evidence for these measures, and for several
instruments, these correlations were the only form of evidence provided to link scores to the
behaviors expected of intellectual humility. Association with the aggregate of situated state selfreports of intellectual humility was a distinctive approach among demonstrations of association
with other self-report measures. The next most common form of evidence was association with
scores representing opinions, attitudes, preferences, attributions about scenarios or people, and
similar direct communications. Though less common, a few validity studies included an
objectively scored measure interpretable in terms of cognition or meta-cognition, specifically
measures of reflective cognition and overclaiming/accuracy. Informant report was gathered as
validity evidence for only one self-report measure, and setting aside questionnaire responses as a
form of behavior, direct observation of behavior was gathered as evidence for only one measure.
Measure authors employed a variety of methods for addressing the possibility of biased
responding. In every case where bias was examined, the process included one or more
questionnaire measures of desirable responding. Though measures of desirable responding were
often positively associated with the scores of the self-report intellectual humility measure, this
was rarely acknowledged as indicative of a potential problem with validity. For one measure, in
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addition to measures of desirable responding, the overclaiming technique and comparison with
informant report were also used to investigate potential bias.
Evidence for these instruments was reviewed in consideration of two rival interpretations
of self-report scores – scores being reflective of intellectual humility and scores being reflective
of valuing intellectual humility. It was found that the evidence provided in validity studies for
measures of intellectual humility is generally compatible with either of these accounts. However,
in addition to these results, most papers also reported findings that are discrepant with
expectations of intellectual humility. Though some discrepant findings are to be expected purely
by chance, the consistency with which such findings occurred across studies suggests a genuine
issue. The most straightforwardly troubling of these discrepant findings is the repeated positive
correlation between scores of intellectual humility and measures of desirable responding
including self-deceptive enhancement, which is an indicator of inflated self-report and inaccurate
self-evaluation (Paulhus, 1988). Scores from intellectual humility measures were also often
found to correlate broadly and to a sizable degree with loosely related and unrelated variables,
suggesting that intellectual humility measures may be susceptible to other forms of method error.
More subtle discrepancies were noted in many cases in the observational studies, but while
subtle, many of those discrepancies have been argued here to suggest problems for interpreting
scores as reflective of intellectual humility rather than merely valuing intellectual humility.
Of the evidence provided in support of existing measures that include the accuracy aspect
of intellectual humility, the most impressive results were those indicating qualities that are
clearly associated with that aspect of intellectual humility even as they are also associated with
valuing intellectual humility. Such findings were presented in support of the GIHS, PSIHS, and
AMIHS in initial validation studies and for the CIHS is subsequent research. Though the effects
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were only shown for a portion of the sample, the findings that GIHS scores predicted lesser
likelihood of derogating opposing arguments and their authors and predicted more favorable
views of changing one’s mind come closest to a direct display of intellectual humility as
anything associated with intellectual humility scores in a validation study. Because these results
with GIHS scores were observed only in the context of groups that are ambivalent about globally
subjecting one’s beliefs to revision (Republicans and Christians), it may be that strongly valuing
intellectual humility functions as a better proxy for intellectual humility in such groups.
In summary, though these measures have not yet been shown to reflect intellectual
humility in both the modesty and accuracy aspects, all of the instruments attempting to measure
the accuracy aspect seem to at least reflect valuing qualities related to intellectual humility, and
some have shown promising though ambiguous findings that suggest the possibility of stronger
interpretations in the future. It is likely that valuing intellectual humility can serve as an
imperfect but useful proxy for intellectual humility in some cases, such as in groups that do not
generally value qualities associated with intellectual humility. However, valuing intellectual
humility is less likely to be an effective proxy within groups that generally value qualities
associated with intellectual humility (engineers, philosophers, college students, etc.). This is a
significant limitation, however, because one of the distinctive features of intellectual humility is
that it is important and often in need of nurturing even among people who are otherwise quite
sophisticated and accomplished with respect to epistemic goods. This is evident in calls for
fostering intellectual humility in professions characterized by learning and success, such as
medical doctors (Schei et al., 2019), philosophers (Mizrahi, 2016), physicists (Gibson, 2003),
and psychological scientists (Franz, 2021). With respect to the long-term project of researching
intellectual humility, any measure of intellectual humility that fails to reflect excessive

56
confidence in highly intellectual people will not only fail to be useful in studying such
populations but will tend to produce an intellectually elitist skew in the basic science of
intellectual humility.
Limitations of the Review
As with any systematic review, the search procedure may not have identified all
instruments. There may be additional unpublished measures or instruments published in an outlet
not indexed. Another limitation of this review is that it applies the most thorough reporting and
scrutiny only to the evidence presented in the paper introducing the instrument wherein theory,
development, and validity arguments were presented. Though some subsequent findings have
been noted in the commentary section where applicable, the original validity studies received
more emphasis because the validity argument was the focus of the review. Thus, this paper might
be said to review measurement development practices in the intellectual humility literature as
much as the instruments themselves. However, because the gathering of validity evidence is an
ongoing process, it is possible that a strong instrument paired with an inadequate initial
validation effort looks weak in this review yet could be supported by a new validity argument
from results demonstrated in subsequent research.
Future Research on the Measurement of Trait Intellectual Humility
If valuing intellectual humility is a good enough proxy of intellectual humility for a given
research purpose, the strongest measures will be those with items that address values or beliefs
rather than ask for self-attributions of behaviors (because self-attributions may be moderate in
intellectually humble people who value intellectual humility highly). If that measurement
strategy is pursued, however, it will be important to consider the way in which valuing the
accuracy elements of intellectual humility differs from valuing open-minded thinking, because
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the actively open-minded thinking construct is a well-researched construct that reflects valuing a
style of thinking and overlaps highly with the thinking described by some measures of
intellectual humility (Baron, 1991). Are there ideas or attitudes or practices that a person with
deep intellectual humility would value that are distinct from actively open-minded thinking and
which would be expected to produce different results? Assessing valuing intellectual humility
may ideally involve a somewhat different item pool than items intended to reflect intellectual
humility directly. If similar themes emerge from expert consideration of that question, existing
measures could work well either as they are or with slight modification. Future studies
examining differences in the associations between IH-relevant outcomes and self-attribution
versus the associations between IH-relevant outcomes and statements of value could also be
informative.
If the goal is instead to measure trait intellectual humility directly, however, it seems that
additional validity testing is required featuring evidence that can differentiate intellectual
humility from merely valuing intellectual humility. In conducting additional validity research,
while it should be possible to develop questionnaire studies that are more targeted toward
addressing the specific threat described in this paper, it may be easier and more informative to
involve other research methods. In particular, response process data and other qualitative data in
mixed-methods studies could add the necessary context for making stronger and more definitive
interpretations of scores. Additionally, collaboration with teams taking other approaches to the
study of intellectual humility could allow for scores to be checked against forms of evidence that
would be hard to gather otherwise, such as expensive or time-consuming observational studies or
experiments (e.g., Hagá & Olson, 2017; Meagher et al, 2015; Reis et al., 2018). When
quantitative study designs are the primary means of investigation, the most relevant variables
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that could offer alternative accounts for favorable results, such as actively open-minded thinking
to reflect values, should be included and run as competing variables in the analysis rather than as
outcome variables, and ideally these comparisons would be made using structural equation
modeling to control for measurement error if the psychometric models are compatible with
structural equation modeling. It may also be informative to compare intellectual humility
measures against composites of interpersonal and cognitive qualities associated with intellectual
humility.
Increased variety of participant selection approaches might also be helpful for revealing
more about the nature of self-attributions of intellectual humility. For a broader perspective,
studies using a nationally representative sample would be a helpful way of checking assumptions
of how self-reported intellectual humility relates to demographic variables that have until now
been based on findings in limited convenience samples. In contrast, more narrowly focusing on
theoretically interesting groups (e.g., epistemologists, intellectual narcissists, Q-Anon followers)
could be a clear way of studying intellectual humility self-report with respect to particular group
characteristics of interest, and this could extend down to the level of case studies.
Intellectual humility researchers would likely benefit from engaging with scholars in
closely related fields that have been working on measurement issues for much longer. In addition
to actively open-minded thinking, the broad network of subjects that has been grouped under the
banner of epistemic cognition is highly relevant to intellectual humility and has invested a great
deal of theoretical and empirical work into measurement strategies (Sinatra, 2016). Epistemic
cognition may also be a helpful literature to learn from with respect to the challenges and
limitations of domain-generality of the accuracy aspects of trait intellectual humility (Hofer et
al., 2006; Muis et al., 2006).
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Perhaps most importantly, development of the next generation of intellectual humility
measures should work from a modern psychometric approach to test development and validation
(e.g., Markus & Borsboom, 2013; Newton & Shaw, 2014). The typical process of developing a
survey measure described in the intellectual humility literature (e.g., Church & Samuelson, 2017)
reflects conventional practice and meets the standards for publication in most psychology
journals, but this conventional paradigm of survey development is prone to under-attending to
the centrality of theory in psychological measurement such that problems with validity are likely
widespread (Borsboom, 2004). Though it may be hard to accept the idea of problematic
measurement practices being widespread, there is a significant gap that has widened over the last
two decades as validity theorists have moved forward and practices have largely stayed stagnant
(Maul, 2017, pp. 9-16). By grounding future measurement work in a modern framework for test
development and validation, measurement claims can be trusted to sit upon solid philosophical
and methodological foundations and scholars will have a more accurate awareness of the
strengths and limitations of measures of intellectual humility.
In conclusion, intellectual humility is arguably as important a topic for research in our
present time as any in all of psychology. However, it is also a difficult topic due to the inherent
complexities of the subject matter and the resulting challenges for creation and validation of
measurement instruments. Existing measures are important first steps toward measuring
intellectual humility, but additional work remains to determine exactly what are the features and
limitations of these instruments and under what conditions scores from these measures can be
expected to reflect the descriptions of intellectual humility found in the literature.

60
References
Alfano, M., Iurino, K., Stey, P., Robinson, B., Christen, M., Yu, F., & Lapsley, D. (2017).
Development and validation of a multi-dimensional measure of intellectual
humility. PloS one, 12(8), e0182950. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182950
American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National
Council on Measurement in Education (Eds.). (1999). Standards for educational and
psychological testing. American Educational Research Association.
American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National
Council on Measurement in Education (Eds.). (2014). Standards for educational and
psychological testing. American Educational Research Association.
Baehr, J. (2011). The inquiring mind: On intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology. Oxford
University Press.
Bailin, S., Case, R., Coombs, J. R., & Daniels, L. B. (1999). Conceptualizing critical
thinking. Journal of curriculum studies, 31(3), 285-302.
https://doi.org/10.1080/002202799183133
Baron, J. (1991). Beliefs about thinking. In J. F. Voss, D. N. Perkins, & J. W. Segal
(Eds.), Informal reasoning and education (pp. 169–186). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.
Baron, J. (2017). Comment on Kahan and Corbin: Can polarization increase with actively openminded thinking? Research & Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016688122
Bernabé-Valero, G., Iborra-Marmolejo, I., Beneyto-Arrojo, M. J., & Senent-Capuz, N. (2018).
The moderating role of intellectual humility in the adoption of ICT: A study across lifespan. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1-6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02433

61
Borsboom, D. (2006). The attack of the psychometricians. Psychometrika, 71(3), 425-440.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11336-006-1447-6
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & Van Heerden, J. (2004). The concept of
validity. Psychological review, 111(4), 1061-1071. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033295X.111.4.1061
Brienza, J. P., Kung, F. Y., Santos, H. C., Bobocel, D. R., & Grossmann, I. (2018). Wisdom,
bias, and balance: Toward a process-sensitive measurement of wisdom-related
cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 115(6), 1093.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000171
Christen, M., Alfano, M., & Robinson, B. (2019). A cross-cultural assessment of the semantic
dimensions of intellectual humility. Ai & Society, 34(4), 785-801.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-017-0791-7
Church, I. M. (2016). The doxastic account of intellectual humility. Logos & Episteme, 7(4),
413-433. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20167441
Church, I. M. (2018). Intellectual Humility and Religious Belief. Journal of Psychology and
Theology, 46(4), 219-242. https://doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807188
Church, I. M., & Barrett, J. L. (2016). Intellectual humility. In E.L. Worthington Jr., D. E. Davis,
& J. N. Hook (Eds.), Handbook of humility (pp. 78-91). Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315660462
Church, I., & Samuelson, P. (2017). Intellectual humility: An introduction to the philosophy and
science. Bloomsbury Publishing.

62
Cronbach, L. J. (1989). Construct validation after thirty years. In R. L. Linn (Ed.), Intelligence:
Measurement, theory, and public policy: Proceedings of a symposium in honor of Lloyd
G. Humphreys (pp. 147–171). University of Illinois Press.
Crooks, T. J., Kane, M. T., & Cohen, A. S. (1996). Threats to the valid use of
assessments. Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice, 3(3), 265-286.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0969594960030302
Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., & Hill, P. C. (2019). Seven challenges of an interdisciplinary project
to measure intellectual humility. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 38(3), 148-156.
Davis, D. E., Worthington Jr, E. L., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Humility: Review of measurement
strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 5(4), 243–252. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439761003791672
Ditto, P. H., Scepansky, J. A., Munro, G. D., Apanovitch, A. M., & Lockhart, L. K. (1998).
Motivated sensitivity to preference-inconsistent information. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 75(1), 53. https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.53
Driver, J. 2001. Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498770
Franz, D. J. (2021). The role of metacognition and motivated reasoning in the response of
psychologists to philosophical criticism. Advance online publication. Journal of
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000167
Funder, D. C. (2012). Accurate personality judgment. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 21(3), 177-182. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963721412445309
Garcia, J. L. (2006). Being unimpressed with ourselves: Reconceiving
humility. Philosophia, 34(4), 417-435. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9032-x

63
Hagá, S., & Olson, K. R. (2017). ‘If I only had a little humility, I would be perfect’: Children’s
and adults’ perceptions of intellectually arrogant, humble, and diffident people. The
Journal of Positive Psychology, 12(1), 87–98.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2016.1167943
Haggard, M., Rowatt, W. C., Leman, J. C., Meagher, B., Moore, C., Fergus, T., Whitcomb, D.,
Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2018). Finding middle ground between
intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility: Development and assessment of the
limitations-owning intellectual humility scale. Personality and Individual Differences,
124, 184–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.12.014
Hazlett, A. (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme, 9(3),
205-223. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11
Hill, P. C., Dunnington, K., & Hall, M. E. L. (2018). Glad intellectual dependence on God: A
theistic account of intellectual humility. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 37(3),
195-204.
Hill, P. C., Lewis Hall, M. E., Wang, D., & Decker, L. A. (2021). Theistic intellectual humility
and well-being: does ideological context matter? The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 16(2), 155-167. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1689424
Hofer, B. K. (2006). Beliefs about knowledge and knowing: Integrating domain specificity and
domain generality: A response to Muis, Bendixen, and Haerle (2006). Educational
Psychology Review, 18(1), 67–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-006-9000-9
Hook, J., Davis, D., Van Tongeren, D., Hill, P., Worthington Jr, E., Farrell, J., & Dieke, P.
(2015). Intellectual humility and forgiveness of religious leaders. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 10(6), 499–506. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2015.1004554

64
Hoyle, R. H., Davisson, E. K., Diebels, K. J., & Leary, M. R. (2016). Holding specific views
with humility: Conceptualization and measurement of specific intellectual humility.
Personality and Individual Differences, 97, 165-172.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.03.043
Hunsley, J., & Meyer, G. J. (2003). The incremental validity of psychological testing and
assessment: conceptual, methodological, and statistical issues. Psychological
assessment, 15(4), 446. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.15.4.446
Jankowski, P. J., Sandage, S. J., Bell, C. A., Ruffing, E. G., & Adams, C. (2019). Humility,
Relational Spirituality, and Well-being among Religious Leaders: A Moderated
Mediation Model. Journal of Religion and Health, 58(1), 132–152.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-018-0580-8
Kahan, D. M. (2015). Climate-science communication and the measurement problem. Political
Psychology, 36, 1–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12244
Kahan, D. M. (2017). Misconceptions, misinformation, and the logic of identity-protective
cognition. Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem. SSRN
Electronic Journal. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973067
Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Dawson, E. C., & Slovic, P. (2017). Motivated numeracy and
enlightened self-government. Behavioural Public Policy, 1(1), 54–86.
https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2016.2
Kane, M. T. (2001). Current concerns in validity theory. Journal of educational
Measurement, 38(4), 319-342. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-3984.2001.tb01130.x
Kane M. (2006). Validity. In R. Brennan (Ed.), Educational measurement (4th ed., pp. 17-64).
American Council on Education and Praeger.

65
Kane, M. (2013). The argument-based approach to validation. School Psychology Review, 42(4),
448-457. https://doi.org/10.1080/02796015.2013.12087465
Kotzee, B. (2015). Problems of assessment in educating for intellectual virtue. In J. Baehr
(Ed.), Intellectual virtues and education (pp. 142-160). Routledge.
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing
one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121-1134. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121
Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J., Haggard, M. C., LaBouff, J. P., & Rowatt, W. C. (2019). Links
between intellectual humility and acquiring knowledge. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 15(2), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1579359
Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J., & Rouse, S. V. (2016). The development and validation of the
Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 98(2),
209–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2015.1068174
Leary, M. R., Diebels, K. J., Davisson, E. K., Jongman-Sereno, K. P., Isherwood, J. C., Raimi,
K. T., Deffler, S.A, & Hoyle, R. H. (2017). Cognitive and interpersonal features of
intellectual humility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(6), 793-813.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217697695
Maul, A. (2017). Rethinking traditional methods of survey validation. Measurement:
Interdisciplinary Research and Perspectives, 15(2), 51-69.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15366367.2017.1348108
McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hill, P. C., Worthington Jr, E. L., & Van
Tongeren, D. R. (2014). Intellectual humility: Scale development and theoretical

66
elaborations in the context of religious leadership. Journal of Psychology and
Theology, 42(1), 19-30. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F009164711404200103
McElroy-Heltzel, S. E., Davis, D. E., DeBlaere, C., Worthington Jr, E. L., & Hook, J. N. (2019).
Embarrassment of riches in the measurement of humility: A critical review of 22
measures. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 14(3), 393-404.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2018.1460686
Meagher, B. R., Leman, J. C., Bias, J. P., Latendresse, S. J., & Rowatt, W. C. (2015).
Contrasting self-report and consensus ratings of intellectual humility and
arrogance. Journal of Research in Personality, 58, 35-45.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2015.07.002
Messick, S. (1989). Validity. In R.L. Linn (Ed.), Educational Measurement (3rd ed., pp. 13-103).
American Counseling on Education/Macmillan.
Mizrahi, M. (2016). Why be an intellectually humble philosopher? Axiomathes, 26(2), 205-218.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-015-9284-9
Muis, K. R., Bendixen, L. D., & Haerle, F. C. (2006). Domain-generality and domain-specificity
in personal epistemology research: Philosophical and empirical reflections in the
development of a theoretical framework. Educational Psychology Review, 18(1), 3–54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-006-9003-6
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2009). Précis of Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to
human reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(1), 69–84.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000284
Paulhus, D. L. (1988). Balanced inventory of desirable responding (BIDR). Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy. Measures Package, 41, 79586-79587.

67
Pennycook, G., Ross, R. M., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2017). Dunning–Kruger effects
in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(6), 1774–1784. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-0171242-7
Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus
others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(3), 369–381.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0146167202286008
Porter, T., Baldwin, C. R., Warren, M. T., Murray, E. D., Cotton Bronk, K., Forgeard, M. J.,
Snow, N. E., & Jayawickreme, E. (2021). Clarifying the Content of Intellectual Humility:
A Systematic Review and Integrative Framework. Journal of Personality Assessment, 113. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2021.1975725
Porter, T., & Schumann, K. (2018). Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view. Self
and Identity, 17(2), 139-162. https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861
Reis, H. T., Lee, K. Y., O’Keefe, S. D., & Clark, M. S. (2018). Perceived partner responsiveness
promotes intellectual humility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 79, 21–33.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.05.006
Rhemtulla, M., Borsboom, D., & van Bork, R. (2017). How to measure nothing. Measurement:
Interdisciplinary Research and Perspectives, 15(2), 95-97.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15366367.2017.1369785
Rhemtulla, M., van Bork, R., & Borsboom, D. (2020). Worse than measurement error:
Consequences of inappropriate latent variable measurement models. Psychological
Methods, 25(1), 30. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000220

68
Roberts, R., & Wood, J. (2003). Humility and Epistemic Goods. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski
(Eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (pp. 257-279).
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.001.0001
Roberts, R., & Wood, J. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology.
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283675.001.0001
Samuelson, P. L., Jarvinen, M. J., Paulus, T. B., Church, I. M., Hardy, S. A., & Barrett, J. L.
(2015). Implicit theories of intellectual virtues and vices: A focus on intellectual
humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 10(5), 389-406.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2014.967802
Sandoval, W. A., Greene, J. A., & Bråten, I. (2016). Understanding and promoting thinking
about knowledge: Origins, issues, and future directions of research on epistemic
cognition. Review of Research in Education, 40(1), 457-496.
https://doi.org/10.3102%2F0091732X16669319
Schwab, A. (2012). Epistemic humility and medical practice: Translating epistemic categories
into ethical obligations. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 37(1), 28-48.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhr054
Schei, E., Fuks, A., & Boudreau, J. D. (2019). Reflection in medical education: intellectual
humility, discovery, and know-how. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 22(2), 167178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-018-9878-2
Sinatra, G. M. (2016). Thoughts on knowledge about thinking about knowledge. In J. A. Greene,
W. A. Sandoval, & I. Bråten (Eds.), Handbook of Epistemic Cognition, 479–491.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315795225

69
Stanovich, K. E., & Toplak, M. E. (2019). The need for intellectual diversity in psychological
science: Our own studies of actively open-minded thinking as a case
study. Cognition, 187, 156-166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.03.006
Tanesini, A. (2018). Intellectual humility as attitude. Philosophy and phenomenological
research, 96(2), 399-420. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12326
Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for
future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19(1), 70-82.
https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2000.19.1.70
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Rational thinking and cognitive
sophistication: Development, cognitive abilities, and thinking
dispositions. Developmental Psychology, 50(4), 1037. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034910
Van Tongeren, D. R., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., & Witvliet, C. V. O. (2019).
Humility. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28(5), 463-468.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963721419850153
West, R. F., Meserve, R. J., & Stanovich, K. E. (2012). Cognitive sophistication does not
attenuate the bias blind spot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(3), 506519. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028857
Westfall, J., & Yarkoni, T. (2016). Statistically controlling for confounding constructs is harder
than you think. PloS one, 11(3), e0152719. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0152719
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2017). Intellectual humility:
Owning our limitations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94(3), 509–539.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12228

70
Zachry, C. E., Phan, L. V., Blackie, L. E., & Jayawickreme, E. (2018). Situation-based
contingencies underlying wisdom-content manifestations: Examining intellectual
humility in daily life. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, 73(8), 1404-1415.
https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gby016
Zettler, I., Lang, J. W., Hülsheger, U. R., & Hilbig, B. E. (2016). Dissociating indifferent,
directional, and extreme responding in personality data: Applying the three‐process
model to self‐and observer reports. Journal of Personality, 84(4), 461-472.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12172
Zhang, H., Hook, J. N., Farrell, J. E., Mosher, D. K., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Davis, D. E.
(2018). The effect of religious diversity on religious belonging and meaning: The role of
intellectual humility. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 10(1), 72.
https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/rel0000108
Zmigrod, L., Zmigrod, S., Rentfrow, P. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2019). The psychological roots of
intellectual humility: The role of intelligence and cognitive flexibility. Personality and
Individual Differences, 141, 200–208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.01.016

71
Table 1.1
Intellectual Humility Content Domains
Domain

Descriptions

Open to other ideas

Open to receiving new information or ideas, even when contrary.
Open to revising one’s viewpoint. Lack of rigidity in views.
Greater likelihood of considering proposed alternative ideas.

Low ego interference

Regulation of one’s concern for being right. Unthreatened by
intellectual disagreement. Moderate reactions to differences of
opinion. Absence of discomfort and negative emotion when
considering limitations.

Awareness of limitations of beliefs

Insight regarding the limitations of one’s knowledge and
understanding. Recognition of the potential fallibility of beliefs.
Acknowledgement of gaps in one’s knowledge. Attending to the
limitations in the evidence supporting beliefs.

Awareness of limitations in ability

An accurate view of intellectual strengths and weaknesses.
Recognition of limitations in one’s ability to obtain and evaluate
pertinent information. Accepting that one’s cognitive faculties are
limited and imperfect.

Pursues truth / seeks evidence

Pursuing and incorporating knowledge and truth from various
sources, including potentially disagreeable sources. Attending to
the evidentiary basis of one’s views. Being appropriately
concerned with the way one acquires and applies knowledge.
Desiring to gain knowledge and increase understanding.

Honest and fair

Presenting evidence for one’s ideas fairly. Avoiding manipulative
strategies for influencing others. Less likely to pretend to know
something.

Relational effectiveness

Respectful and attentive to the perspective of others during
discussions of differences. Sensitive to how ideas will be received
by specific others. Willingness to compromise or negotiate.
Relatively less interpersonal conflict due to ideas.

Low arrogance / overconfidence

Rarely assuming competence. Regulating arrogance. Avoiding
unjustified confidence in the evidentiary basis for one’s beliefs.
Lack of overconfidence regarding the correctness of opinions and
beliefs. Less likely to base a confident decision on incorrect
information. Tends not to pretend to have knowledge.

Valuing the knowledge of others

Work collaboratively with those with more informative
perspectives. Respect for and openness to the views of other
people.
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Table 1.2
Basic Properties of Intellectual Humility Measures
Scale name
Cultural Humility
Scale (Hook et al.,
2013; 12 items);
Other-report

Example item
Is genuinely
interested in
learning more.

Number of
factors

Alpha

Temporal stability

Convergent evidence (|r| > .30)

Criterion evidence

2

Full scale from Not tested
.86 to .93;
Subscale from
.84 to .93

Not tested

Intellectual Humility Always has to have
Scale (McElroy et al.,the last word in an
2014; 16 items);
argument. (reverse
Other-report
coded)

2

Full scale of .94 Not tested
and .96;
Subscale from
.92 to .94

Positively correlated with trust, agreeableness, IHS scores predict rater-selected
openness, conscientiousness, and benevolent exemplars of extreme high or low IH
transgression-related interpersonal motivation.
Negatively correlated with neuroticism, anger
towards God, and avoidant transgressionrelated interpersonal motivation.

Specific Intellectual When it comes to
Humility Scale
my views about
(Hoyle et al., 2016; _______ I may be
9 and 3 item
overlooking
versions); Self-report evidence.

1

From .88 to .96 Not tested

For some content topics, positively correlated evaluation of forms of evidence with
with general intellectual humility.
respect to a specific topic (for few topics
and forms of evidence only despite many
tested)

Comprehensive
I can respect
Intellectual Humility others, even if I
Scale (Krumreidisagree with them
Mancuso et al., 2016; in important ways.
22 items); Self-report

4

Full scale from
.82 to 88;
Subscale from
.70 to .89

Positively correlated with intellectual
Open-minded thinking and openness to
openness, self-correction, accurate selfexperience when controlling for other
perception, open-minded thinking, and
relevant variables
openness to experience. Negatively correlated
with intellectual arrogance.

General Intellectual
Humility Scale
(Leary et al., 2017;
6 items); Self-report

1

From .73 to .87. Not tested

Positively correlated with openness epistemic More moderate religious views;
curiosity, existential quest, need for cognition, preference for balanced arguments; less
intellectual humility, open-mindedness,
negative response to disagreeable
autonomy, and courage. Negatively correlated information; more favorable attitudes
with dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, andtoward those who change their mind;
self-righteousness.
greater discernment of argument quality

3

full scale: .87;
subscales: .80.87

Positively correlated with intellectual
humility, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
neuroticism. Negatively correlated with
neuroticism and closed-mindedness.

I accept that my
beliefs and
attitudes may be
wrong.

Limitations-Owning I care about the
Intellectual Humility truth.
Scale (Haggard et al.,
2018; 12 items); Selfreport

Full scale of 75 (1
month) and .70 (3
months); Subscale
from .56 to .74 (1
month) and .50 to
.76 (3 months)

.75 (5 months)

retrospective report of working alliance;
report of ongoing working alliance;
report of ongoing working alliance;

closed-mindedness, assertiveness,
authentic pride
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Scale name

Example item

Number of
factors

Alpha

Temporal stability

Convergent evidence (|r| > .30)

Criterion evidence

Porter and Schumann I am willing to
Intellectual Humility admit it if I don’t
Scale (PSIHS; Porter know something.
& Schumann, 2018;
9 items); Self-report

1

Average of .74 Not tested

Positively correlated with general humility,
agreeableness, growth mindset, openness to
experience, need for cognition, modesty,
learning goals, and conscientiousness.

Attributions of respectful intent and
greater openness in response to
disagreement scenarios. Preference for
reading about an opposing view rather
than a congenial view.

Alfano MultiIf someone points
Dimensional
out an intellectual
Intellectual Humility mistake that I’ve
Scale (AMIHS;
made, I tend to get
Alfano et al., 2017; angry. (reverse
22 items); Self-report coded)

4

Not reported
Not tested
(item-response
theoretic
analyses
presented
instead)

Positively correlated with informant reports.
Negatively correlated with narcissism at the
subscale level.

Open-mindedness subscale predicting
overclaiming bias most strongly in
regression with Big Six personality traits.

Theistic Intellectual I try to submit all
Humility Scale
my intellectual
(TIHS; Hill et al.,
efforts to God
2021; 11 items); Selfreport

3

Full scale .83.85

Not tested

Positively correlated at the subscale level with Favorably moderating the influence of
Conscientiousness and Need for Cognition. religious commitment on several
Negatively associated at the subscale level
indicators of well-being.
with hubristic pride.

State-Trait
Intellectual Humility
Scale (STIHS;
Zachry et al., 2018)

1

Full scale .91

Not tested

Positively correlated with authentic pride,
Aggregated state measure scores taken
Extraversion, Agreeableness,
from experience sampling.
Conscientiousness, Openness, Altruism,
prestige, existential quest, actively openminded thinking, and tolerance. Negatively
correlated with dogmatism, self-righteousness,
and need for closure.

I search actively
for reasons why
my beliefs might
be wrong
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2 THE VALIDITY OF THE GENERAL INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY SCALE AS A
MEAURE OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
When people fail to recognize the limitations of their own perspectives, systems that rely
on the exchange of ideas can break down, contributing to a variety of societal problems. Bias and
arrogance can undermine crucial decision-making processes (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005), political
polarization can shut down a nation’s politics (Garimella & Weber, 2017; Lee et al., 2018;
Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016), and holding a view based on misinformation can lead to
dangerous public health situations (Enders, et al., 2020; Joslyn, 2017; Marlon et al., 2016). These
and other situations might be benefited by a deeper understanding of intellectual humility, and in
the past decade, psychologists and other scholars have collaborated to begin the empirical
investigation of this virtue.
Early work in the empirical study of trait intellectual humility resulted in the
development of many self-report questionnaire measures, and these questionnaires have been the
most common method employed in empirical studies of intellectual humility (McElroy-Heltzel et
al., 2019; Porter et al., 2021). Though direct self-report is a widely employed method of
assessment in the social sciences, it is not appropriate for every application (Paulhus & Vazire,
2007). Some scholars have noted that intellectual humility and closely-related constructs seems
to be especially bad candidates for the use of self-report measures (Christen et al., 2019; Brienza
et al., 2018), and early in the course of studying intellectual humility, multiple studies have
found evidence suggesting that self-report may not be accurate (Alfano et al., 2017; Haggard et
al., 2018; Hill et al., 2021; Meagher et al., 2015; Meagher et al., 2021; Meagher, 2022; Zachry et
al., 2019).
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Though the problem of desirability bias has received the most attention in discussions of
measuring intellectual humility, a potentially more serious threat is that it seems intellectual
humility is required in order to provide an accurate self-report of intellectual humility.
Specifically, similarly to how people sometimes lack the perspective required to recognize their
limitations with respect to cognitive tasks (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Pennycook et al., 2017),
people low in intellectual humility may simply be unaware of their limitations with respect to
intellectual humility. In contrast, those highest in intellectual humility may be attentive enough
to universal human limitations that they might rate themselves moderately without any intent of
downplaying their strengths. This would mean that self-reports may be perversely related with
intellectual humility among people who strongly value qualities associated with intellectual
humility, even in the absence of any form of desirability bias.
Because initial validity testing tends to be generally confirmatory (Maul, 2017), problems
with measurement can easily slip past initial validity testing (Borsboom, 2006), and more critical
validity testing conducted from outside of the author team is generally required to identify and
probe potential problems (Kane, 2006). In the case of self-report measures of intellectual
humility, the threat of inaccurate self-report is a serious one in need of additional investigation.
The purpose of the present study is to conduct a set of more critical tests of validity for one of the
more promising self-report measures of intellectual humility and, in doing so, gather evidence
about the accuracy of the self-report of intellectual humility as well.
Intellectual Humility as a Psychological Construct
The intellectual humility concept in psychology has its origins in the philosophy literature
on virtue epistemology, an area of philosophy that considers the possession of strong intellectual
character as the means by which individuals are able to arrive at true beliefs and other epistemic
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goods (Church & Samuelson, 2017). As one of the epistemic virtues, philosophers have defined
intellectual humility variously, but a definition provided by Whitcomb et al. (2017) has been
particularly influential on early psychological measurement work, having been cited as either
influential or foundational for several instruments. Whitcomb et al. define intellectual humility as
“proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one’s intellectual limitations” (2017, p. 520) and argue
that intellectual humility in practice emerges from dispositions spanning cognition, emotion, and
behavior. Notably, the limitations-owning account does not necessarily require a person to be
free of arrogance in order to be intellectually humble, but it is argued that a rational person who
is intellectually humble will also be lacking in arrogance (Whitcomb et al., 2017, pp. 20-25).
In translating the intellectual humility (IH) concept from philosophy into psychological
research, psychologists have provided numerous definitions alongside the introduction of new
measurement instruments. The earliest published measurement instruments defined IH as a
subdomain of general humility (Hook et al., 2015; McElroy et al., 2014). On this account, IH
“involves an accurate or moderate view of one’s strengths and weaknesses” concerning
knowledge and intellectual influence along with “being interpersonally other-oriented rather than
self-focused, marked by an ability to restrain egotism” (McElroy et al., p. 20). Subsequent
authors of IH measures have attempted to specify the nature of intellectual humility
independently rather than characterizing it chiefly in terms of general humility, though some of
these authors nevertheless grant that intellectual humility can be considered a subdomain of
general humility (Porter & Schumann, 2018). Measure authors have defined intellectual humility
as “a nonthreatening awareness of intellectual fallibility” (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016, p.
210), “the recognition that a particular personal view may be fallible accompanied by appropriate
attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis of that view and to one’s own limitations in
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obtaining and evaluating information relevant to it” (Leary et al., 2017, p. 1), “the mean between
intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility” (Haggard et al., 2018, p. 185), and as “a
willingness to recognize the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciate others’ intellectual
strengths” (Porter & Schumann, 2018, p. 140).
Though these definitions show a breadth and diversity in what authors have centralized in
their conceptualization of IH, these authors’ expositions of the IH concept clearly reflect a shared
influence of virtue epistemology on the understanding of the construct. Those high in IH are
expected to “receive contrary ideas without taking offense” and to handle conflicting views
without being impatient or defensive (McElroy et al., 2014, p. 20). When they lack justified
knowledge, they should “be receptive to inviting multiple perspectives and altering views if new
information arises” (Haggard et al., 2018, p. 185). They are expected to “pay greater attention to
evidence that bears on their beliefs” (Leary et al., 2017, p. 13) and to “be open to alternate
evidence” even when it is contrary to their existing views (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016, p.
210).
In summary, psychological conceptualizations of IH have tended to incorporate the idea
of a generally humble person with notions of intellectual virtue. The claim of intellectual or
epistemic virtue is present in the conceptualization of IH across measures generally, and it is this
claim that invites the most serious complications for self-report. Accordingly, a priority for the
intellectual humility measurement literature is testing the epistemic expectations of a measure
focused on this aspect of intellectual humility.
Development and Initial Validity Evidence for the GIHS
The present study focuses upon on the General Intellectual Humility Scale (GIHS; Leary
et al., 2017). The GIHS was selected for the present study because it is the only measure of
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intellectual humility entirely focused on cognition and metacognition, which are the aspects of
intellectual humility that are most in need of additional testing with respect to potential problems
with self-report. The authors of the GIHS define intellectual humility as “recognizing that a
particular personal belief may be fallible, accompanied by an appropriate attentiveness to
limitations in the evidentiary basis of that belief and to one’s own limitations in obtaining and
evaluating relevant information” (Leary et al., 2017, p. 793). Additionally, because these
epistemic elements of intellectual humility are what most clearly distinguishes the construct from
general humility, testing this element in isolation is likely to provide clearly complementary
insights to findings from prior work examining the accuracy of self-reported humble character
(e.g., Zettler et al., 2016).
In terms of situating the measure within a nomological network, GIHS scores were
shown to be positively correlated with several other relevant constructs, including openness (r =
.33), epistemic curiosity (r = .35), existential quest (r = .35), need for cognition (r = .34), a
single-item self-report of intellectual humility (r =.37), open-mindedness (r =.43), intellectual
autonomy (r = .31), and intellectual courage (r = .30; Leary et al., 2017). Scores were also shown
to be negatively correlated with dogmatism (r = -.49), intolerance of ambiguity (r = -.32), and
self-righteousness (r = -.35). These findings are generally in line with what one would expect
from theory, showing sizable correlations with other intellectual virtues, openness, and cognitive
dispositions compatible with intellectual humility. However, the most informative single result
of these correlations is the especially large negative relationship with dogmatism, which raises
the question of the extent to which the GIHS reflects something distinct from low dogmatism.
An additional limitation of this evidence is the omission of comparisons with cognitive variables
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such as cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005), an instrument that not only overlaps conceptually
but which has the benefit of objective scoring.
In addition to situating their measure within a nomological network of related constructs,
the authors also offered initial criterion-related evidence of validity in the form of three studies.
In the first of these three studies, the authors examined a set of predictions concerning how one
reacts when faced with a position with which one disagrees. The primary claims to be tested
were (a) that people scoring high on the GIHS “should be more willing to entertain beliefs that
differ from their own” and (b) that they would “judge people whose views differ from theirs less
negatively” (Leary et al., p. 798). However, no analysis was presented showing the relationship
between GIHS scores, specific beliefs held by participants, and the reaction of participants to
beliefs that differ from their own or people holding differing beliefs. Instead, the authors showed
that the GIHS predicted lesser belief certainty, lesser belief extremity, greater agreement with
arguments that religion has negative impacts on society, and a general tendency to favorably rate
essay content and author characteristics regardless of the essay’s tone toward religion. The
finding that GIHS scores predicted general agreement with the content of every essay condition
is especially noteworthy in that it precludes treating any of the essays as disagreeable content for
those scoring high on the GIHS. Thus, we do not have an answer concerning how those high on
the GIHS react to beliefs that differ from their own nor how they judge people whose views
differ from their own.
In the second study, the authors tested a prediction concerning reactions to people
changing their attitude about a topic. Participants read a scenario about a fictional political
candidate who had announced a change in his view on an unspecified environmental issue. The
primary hypothesis was that people scoring high on the GIHS would rate the candidate who
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changed his mind more positively than those with low scores on the GIHS. This hypothesis was
partially supported, with interesting implications for the overall measurement claims of the
GIHS. The GIHS did predict a markedly more favorable view toward the candidate changing his
viewpoint among Republicans. However, scores on the GIHS did not result in more positive
evaluations of the candidate among either Democrats or Independents, departing from the
authors’ prediction that the GIHS would generally predict more positive responses to a view
change.
This final study sought to demonstrate that GIHS scores would predict greater sensitivity
and responsiveness to argument quality about the importance of flossing, especially among
individuals who did not report flossing regularly. Whereas the GIHS did predict greater
sensitivity to argument quality among non-flossers, the GIHS did not predict greater sensitivity
to evidence quality among those who flossed regularly. Because people in general may pay
closer attention to arguments that are challenging to existing beliefs or behaviors and which may
result in needing to act (Ditto et al., 1998), it is not clear that this result should be interpreted as
indicative of IH. Instead, if the GIHS had predicted greater sensitivity to argument quality even
for information that was congenial to existing beliefs and personally flattering, that would have
been more congruent with the expectation that those high in IH are distinctively attentive to the
evidentiary basis of their own beliefs.
Altogether, these studies (Leary et al., 2017) demonstrate that GIHS scores predict a
degree of intellectual agreeableness and engagement that may be consistent with IH, but they do
not establish the core claim in the GIHS IH definition: consideration that one’s beliefs might be
fallible involving attentiveness to the evidentiary basis of one’s own beliefs and to one’s own
limitations in assessing such evidence. If GIHS scores are reflective of qualities related to IH
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such as valuing knowledge and critical thought rather than being reflective of IH per se, this is a
reason for concern because those qualities may at times contribute to arrogance (e.g., Gibson,
2003). Given these ambiguities, it important to continue to study the GIHS through a second
wave of more pointedly critical tests of construct validity.
The Present Study
The principal shortcoming of the original validity paper for the GIHS (Leary et al., 2017)
was that it did not directly test the core claims of the instrument–that those scoring high on the
GIHS are strong at attending to the limitations in the evidentiary basis of their beliefs and to their
own limitations with respect to assessing the quality of evidence pertaining to their beliefs. In the
interest of more decisively determining the strengths and limitations of the GIHS as a measure of
IH, I identified and conducted three theory-informed tests of these core claims.

Test 1: GIHS Scores and Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs
Leary et al. (2017) contended that people high on the GIHS are aware of the evidentiary
basis of their beliefs and noted that this could be expected to lead to holding beliefs that are more
realistic over time. One way to more directly test this prediction is to see how well GIHS scores
predict endorsement of beliefs that are generally accepted as unwarranted or false (e.g., the moon
landing was a hoax, vaccines cause autism, ghosts haunt old buildings). If a person endorses
many such unwarranted beliefs, that would suggest that they are not especially attentive to the
evidentiary basis of their beliefs, which should be reflected in a lower score on the GIHS. Even
more so, if a person expresses certainty that such beliefs are true or persists in believing in such
beliefs despite claiming to have researched the issue, then that would demonstrate a lack of
attentiveness to evidence and lack of awareness of one’s limitations in evaluating evidence, both
qualities that would be strongly in conflict with the GIHS notion of IH. The GIHS should thus be
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strongly predictive of lesser endorsement of false beliefs, lesser certainty about false beliefs, and
lesser tendency to have claimed to research a topic while endorsing the unwarranted view as true.

Test 2: GIHS Scores and Bias Blind Spot
In addition to attending to the evidence supporting specific beliefs, the GIHS is also
meant to reflect awareness of “one’s own limitations in obtaining and evaluating relevant
information” (Leary et al., 2017, p. 793). Initial validity tests did not directly test this claim, yet
one way of testing this would be to examine how well GIHS scores correlate with a measure of
bias blind spot (Pronin et al., 2002). The bias blind spot refers to the tendency for people to think
that bias is a problem for other people but is problematic to a lesser degree for themselves.
Cognitive bias blind spot tests specifically check if someone is self-aware that they are limited
by certain robust intellectual biases, and people who are otherwise cognitively sophisticated
remain susceptible to a cognitive bias blind spot and may even be more prone to that blind spot
(West et al., 2012). If those scoring high on the GIHS are aware of their own limitations with
respect to engaging and evaluating information, then that would necessarily include an
awareness and acceptance that they are susceptible to universal cognitive biases. If, on the other
hand, the GIHS is associated with increased bias blind spot, then that would raise the question of
whether the endorsements of GIHS items are similarly rooted in excessively positive selfevaluation. Accordingly, GIHS scores should be negatively associated with bias blind spot.

Test 3: GIHS Scores and Political Polarization about Global Warming
The GIHS authors contended that people high in IH should not only be generally
attentive to evidence but should specifically be receptive to evidence that conflicts with existing
beliefs (Leary et al., 2017). One way to provide a rigorous test of this prediction is to test
whether an individual aligns with an evidence-based view on topics even when cultural and
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group affiliations provide obstacles to accepting that view. A strong example of the difficulty of
navigating conflicts between evidence, identity, and group membership can be seen in motivated
skepticism concerning anthropogenic climate change. Political ideology and political affiliations
strongly influence beliefs about global warming despite a clear scientific consensus on the matter
and despite efforts to educate the public on relevant matters. Importantly, cognitive strengths
such as greater education levels, intelligence, effortful thinking, and critical thinking amplify
political polarization rather than protect against it, with these strengths allowing for more
sophisticated motivated reasoning (Kahan, 2015). This is likely because skepticism concerning
anthropogenic global warming is largely driven by personal motivations rather than
consideration of evidence (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). This makes acceptance of anthropogenic
climate change among American conservatives an apt test for the GIHS because it represents a
case where the evidence supporting a position is clear yet is often rejected either without critical
reflection or through motivated reasoning. Accordingly, if the GIHS scores attenuate the effect
of political orientation on belief in anthropogenic global warming and predict belief in
anthropogenic global warming among conservatives, it would be a strong point of evidence in
support of the construct validity of the GIHS.
In summary, the purpose of the present study was to conduct three sets of tests of validity
in order to advance the understanding of the GIHS and self-report of IH generally. To the degree
that GIHS scores reflect IH as described by Leary et al.’s (2017) definition of IH, the following
hypotheses should hold.
RQ1: GIHS Scores and Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs
H1a: GIHS scores should correlate negatively with endorsement of unwarranted
beliefs.
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H1b: GIHS scores should correlate negatively with expressing certainty that an
unwarranted belief is true.
H1c: GIHS scores should correlate negatively with claiming to have carefully
researched an unwarranted belief yet still endorsing it as true.
RQ2: GIHS Scores and Bias Blind Spot
H2: GIHS scores should correlate negatively with cognitive bias blind spot.
RQ3: Do those scoring high on the GIHS accept evidence-supported views when doing
so is difficult?
H3a: GIHS scores should attenuate the influence of political orientation on belief
in anthropogenic global warming.
H3b: GIHS scores should be positively associated with belief in anthropogenic
global warming among political conservatives.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants (N = 481) were recruited from the research participant crowdsourcing
platform Prolific (224 female [46.6%]; 246 male [51.1%]; 10 non-binary [2.1%]), ranging in age
from 18 to 77 (M = 34.31, SD = 12.96). Prolific is a research-focused competitor of Amazon’s
widely used Mechanical Turk, which has recently come under scrutiny related to problems with
data quality (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013; Goodman et al.,
2013). Prolific has several advantages for data quality relative to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
Qualtrics, or other competitors (Peer et al., 2017). Perhaps most importantly, Prolific takes
measures to maintain the quality of the respondent pool, promote accuracy in demographic
information, and protect against some of the pitfalls that tend to plague competing platforms
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(Palan & Schitter, 2018). As a major advantage compared to traditional survey firms such as
Qualtrics, Prolific offers economical prescreening options, allowing for quota sampling to ensure
greater diversity of beliefs and values relevant to my central research questions. Accordingly, in
line with recent polling data from Gallup showing the United States adult population to be 35%
conservative, 35% moderate, 26% liberal, and 4% other (Saad, 2019), I prescreened using
Prolific Academic’s demographic data to select 175 conservatives, 175 moderates, 130 liberals,
and 20 identifying as “other” from the pool of American participants available through Prolific.
Recruitment and data collection occurred on March 10, 2021. Following informed
consent, participants completed a questionnaire including demographic items and study
measures. A total of 500 participants completed the study. Thirteen participants were excluded
because they failed at least one of two manipulation checks, items which asked participants to
input a specified response to show adequate attention to the task. An additional six participants
were disqualified for not responding to any open response items, indicating inadequate effort.
This resulted in the final sample of 481 participants.
The sample was predominately White/Caucasian, with 69.6% (n = 335) identifying as
White/Caucasian, 9.6% (n = 46) as Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.2% (n = 30) as Black/AfricanAmerican, 6.2% (n = 30) as Hispanic/Latino/a, 7.2% (n = 35) as multiracial/two or more races,
and 1% (n = 5) as other. Regarding religious affiliation, 29.3% (n = 141) reported as Protestant
Christian, 19.8% (n = 95) as Agnostic, 14.1% (n = 68) as Roman Catholic, 13.5% (n = 65) as
Atheist, 11.2% (n = 54) as having no particular affiliation, 1.7% (n = 8) as Mormon, 1.7% (n = 8)
as Buddhist, .8% (n = 4) as Jewish, .6% (n = 3) as Hindu, .4% (n = 2) as Orthodox Christian,
5.4% (n = 26) as other, and .4% (n = 2) provided no response. In addition to these affiliations,
22.7% (n = 109) indicated that they would also describe themselves as a born-again or
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evangelical Christian, and 56.8% (n = 273) reported having a relationship with God or a higher
being. With respect to the highest level of school completed or highest degree received, 1% (n =
5) reported less education than a high school degree, 12.7% (n = 61) reported a high school
diploma, 24.9% (n = 120) reported some college, 8.1% (n = 39) reported an Associate’s degree,
36.2% (n = 174) reported a Bachelor’s degree, 14.1% (n = 68) reported a Master’s degree, 1.5%
(n = 7) reported a Doctorate, and 1.5% (n = 7) reported a professional degree.
Measures
General Intellectual Humility
General intellectual humility was measured using the General Intellectual Humility Scale
(GIHS; Leary et al., 2017). The GIHS is a single-factor measure comprised of six items such as
“I accept that my beliefs and attitudes may be wrong.” Response choices are arranged on a 5point Likert-like scale ranging from not at all like me to very like me, with higher scores intended
to reflect greater general intellectual humility. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha values for GIHS
scores ranged from .73 to .87 across six samples. Additional validity evidence is discussed at
length above.
Unwarranted Beliefs
The tendency to hold unwarranted beliefs and the tendency to claim certainty about such
beliefs were measured by the Inventory of Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs (IEUB; Dyer &
Hall, 2018). The IEUB consists of 50 items with response choices arranged on a 5-point Likertlike scale, ranging from 1 (totally sure it’s false) to 5 (totally sure it’s true). Items consist of
statements of claims that lack adequate supporting evidence (e.g., routine childhood vaccines
cause developmental problems such as autism in children). The scale is comprised of such
statements from six content categories to provide broad coverage of a variety of beliefs:
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paranormal, religious, health pseudoscience, extraordinary life forms, conspiracy theories, and
ghosts. An unscored subscale of 12 general science knowledge items is also included to prevent
strategic responding (i.e., recognizing that all items will be false). Higher subscale scores reflect
holding unwarranted beliefs in a specific content domain and higher total scores reflect holding
unwarranted beliefs generally. At the item-level, scores of four or five (after reversing where
appropriate) reflect endorsing a belief and scores of five reflect endorsing a belief as certainly
true, so belief and belief certainty can be assessed by dichotomizing scores at these points (Dyer
& Hall, 2018, p. 300).
Confirmatory principal components analysis has supported the 6-category subscale
structure of the IEUB. IEUB scores were shown to be stable over time, with average scores in a
control group showing no statistically significant change in score between testing at the start and
end of the semester for total score and for all 6 subscale scores. The IEUB also showed strong
criterion-related evidence of validity in reflecting the effect of instruction in critical thinking and
pseudoscience on scale scores over a semester. The IEUB showed additional evidence of validity
in demonstrating expected relationships with other variables pre-intervention including academic
major and self-reported SAT scores.
The tendency to endorse unwarranted beliefs despite claiming to have researched the
issue was also assessed using the IEUB. After completing the IEUB, participants were presented
with a list of the unwarranted beliefs they endorsed (scores of four or five), generated via logic
operations native to the Qualtrics survey platform. Participants were asked to select any beliefs
that they had carefully researched to determine the truth of the issue. The number of selections
on this screen determined the count of endorsed beliefs also endorsed as carefully researched. In
conjunction with IEUB results, this additional item set allows for identifying cases where a
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respondent has endorsed an unwarranted belief despite claiming to have carefully researched the
topic, suggesting selective attention to evidence, overestimation of one’s ability to evaluate the
relevant information, over-claiming about what has been researched, or some combination of
these.
Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming
Belief in anthropogenic global warming was assessed by an unnamed measure created by
Hennes et al. (BAGW; 2016). The BAGW is a single-factor scale comprised of seven items such
as “Do you believe that global warming is anthropogenic (caused by human behavior)?”
Response choices are arranged on a 7-point Likert-like scale ranging from 1 (definitely not; not
at all likely) to 7 (definitely, extremely likely). High scores reflect strong belief in anthropogenic
climate change while low scores reflect strong denial of anthropogenic climate change. This
scale showed strong evidence of reliability with Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of .96 and
convergent evidence of validity in demonstrating expected relationships with attitudes toward the
environment, economic values, and political alignment (Hennes et al., 2016).
Science Intelligence
Scientific intelligence was assessed by The Ordinary Science Intelligence Scale 2.0 (OSI;
Kahan, 2017). The OSI is single-factor measure comprised of 18 items. It is designed to
“measure a latent capacity to recognize and make use of valid scientific evidence in everyday
decision-making” (Kahan, 2017). Though it is a novel combination of elements, it is composed
from prior measures: science knowledge from the NSF Indicators Battery (National Science
Board, 2014) and the Pew Science and Technology battery (Pew Research Center, 2013),
understanding of scientific methods from the NSF Indicators Battery, quantitative reasoning
ability from the Lipkus/Peters Numeracy battery (Lipkus et al., 2001), and a 3-item test of
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cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005). The full scale has shown strong evidence of reliability,
with initial testing showing a Cronbach’s alpha of .83. Factor analysis of the OSI supported the
claim of a general factor accounting for observed variance among all items, and analysis of item
response curves demonstrated strong evidence of reliability across the range of item difficulty
(Kahan, 2017). Additionally, the OSI also showed strong criterion-related evidence of validity in
demonstrating expected relationships with other cognitive constructs including numeracy,
education level, and actively open-minded thinking (Kahan, 2017).
Political Orientation
Following prior research demonstrating the influence of political affiliation and ideology
on the exercise of critical thinking about scientific facts (Kahan, 2016), political party selfidentification was measured with a 7-point scale (strong Democrat, Democrat, independent lean
Democrat, Independent, independent lean Republican, Republican, strong Republican), and
political ideology was measured with a 5-point item (very liberal, liberal, moderate,
conservative, very conservative). A total left-right political orientation score was derived by
summing the distance from the median point for both scales.
Bias Blind Spot
Bias blind spot was measured using the Bias Blind Spot Questionnaire (BSQ; West et al.,
2012). The BSQ is a single-factor assessment comprised of 7 items. Response choices are
arrayed on a 5-point Likert-like scale with response choices ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5
(very likely). The BSQ reflects the extent to which people believe themselves to be superior to
others at avoiding biases which have been demonstrated to be universal. Higher scores reflect
excessive confidence concerning one’s ability to avoid cognitive bias. Respondents are presented
with a description of each cognitive bias and asked to rate how susceptible they believe
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themselves to be and how susceptible they believe the average person in their context (e.g.,
average student at a specific school, average American) to be. Rating others as more likely than
oneself to have these biases is therefore considered an inaccurate assessment of one’s own
limitations relative to the limitations of others because the included biases have been shown to be
intractable to superior intellectual ability or cognitive sophistication. Examples of specific biases
represented in the questionnaire include myside bias, framing effects, and anchoring effects.
Overall scores for bias blind spot are obtained by summing the differences between self-rating
and the rating of other people for each item. The BSQ has demonstrated criterion-related
evidence of validity in that it was shown to be predictive of unwarranted confidence rather than a
genuine lesser susceptibility to bias, confirmed by testing the ability of individuals and finding
that those claiming to do better than average did not in fact do better (West et al., 2012).
Power Analysis
Sample size was determined based on an estimate of what would be needed to detect the
predicted interaction effects. Based on prior research, the effect size of the relationship between
political orientation and BAGW was expected to be large (e.g. Evans & Feng, 2013). Assuming
a large effect size (f2 = .35), an alpha of .05, a power of .8, and one predictor, G*Power 3.1
indicated a sample size of 25 would be needed to detect the effect of political orientation on
BAGW (Faul et al, 2009). Because a two-way interaction involving GIHS and political
orientation was expected to attenuate rather than eliminate or reverse the main effect, the sample
size to detect an interaction reducing the effect by 50% would need to be fourteen times as large
as was needed to detect the main effect with an alpha or .05 and a power of .80, indicating a
required sample size of 350 (Giner-Sorrola, 2018; Simonsohn, 2014).
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Analyses were conducted using IMB SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 27. Of the
481 participants remaining after exclusions, thirty-eight cases had some missing data. The range
of missing data for these participants was between 1.1% and 2.2%. Overall missingness was less
than .1%, no scale or subscale variable had more than .2% of data missing, and no item had more
than .8% of data missing. Missing responses for OSI items were coded as incorrect answers,
affecting 12 of 8,654 total OSI data points, with no more than two data points for any item, and
no more than one data point for any participant. The Little’s MCAR test was significant,
indicating that data were not likely to be MCAR. Data were thus assumed to be MAR after
inspecting patterns of missingness for each variable (Schafer & Graham, 2002; Schlomer, et al.,
2010). Regardless of the mechanism of missingness, the impact on findings is expected to be
negligible given the very low level of missing data (Bennett, 2001; Peng et al., 2006; Schafer,
1999). Given these findings, missing data were handled with the available item analysis method
(Parent, 2013).
Hypotheses were tested using bivariate correlations and linear regression models. A
variety of quantitative descriptive statistics were examined for all study variables including
means, standard deviations, minimum/maximum values, and quartiles along with visual plots
(histograms) to better understand the distributional properties of the variables. Visual inspection
of data revealed significant non-normality for AGW along with expected departures from
normality for IEUB count variables. Accordingly, both Pearson (parametric) and Spearman (nonparametric) correlations were examined to assess bivariate relations among variables.
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Linear regression has four core assumptions: (a) the relationships between independent
variables and the dependent variable are linear, (b) the residual variance is the same across
values of independent variables (homoscedasticity), (c) observations are independent, and (d)
residuals are normally distributed (Pituch & Stevens, 2016). These assumptions were empirically
evaluated using a variety of approaches including residual histograms (normality of residuals), qq and p-p plots (normality of residuals), and residual-by-predicted value scatter plots (linearity
and homoscedasticity). Multicollinearity was assessed by the variance inflation factor (VIF), and
residuals were inspected for potential influential outliers using the plots described above and
with Cook’s and Mahalanobis distance statistics.
Empirical checks suggested that assumptions for BAGW were not adequately met due to
non-normality of residuals. Model fit criteria and assumption checks (e.g., residual plots)
supported using linear regression with the reversed and log transformed version of BAGW
(Tabachnick, et al., 2019, 7th ed., pp. 75-76). After applying these transformations, all empirical
evaluations of linear regression model assumptions were adequately met and there were no
concerns regarding multicollinearity or influential outliers.
Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for primary study variables are reported in
Table 2.1. GIHS scores were negatively associated with reporting having a relationship with God
(r = -.12, p = .009) and negatively associated with identifying as Protestant (r = -.12, p = .012).
GIHS scores were positively associated with identifying as an Atheist (r = .14, p = .002) and
were unrelated with identifying as Agnostic (r = .07, p = .152). GIHS scores were unrelated to
age (r = -.07, p = .128), education level (r = .06, p = .226), or gender (r = -.070, p = .128). GIHS
scores were negatively associated with left-right political orientation (r = -.25, p < .001),
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meaning higher GIHS scores were associated with being more liberal/Democrat and less
conservative/Republican.
Research Question 1
The first set of three hypotheses concerned the question of whether GIHS scores would
be negatively associated with epistemically unwarranted beliefs. Hypothesis 1a was that GIHS
scores would correlate negatively with endorsement of unwarranted beliefs. GIHS scores were
negatively correlated with IEUB mean score (r = -.13, p = .005) but were unrelated to the count
of unwarranted beliefs endorsed (rs = -.09, p = .054). Thus, Hypothesis 1a was partially
supported. Hypothesis 1b was that GIHS scores would correlate negatively with the count of
unwarranted beliefs endorsed with certainty. GIHS scores were unrelated to the count of
unwarranted beliefs endorsed with certainty (rs = -.08, p = .715). Thus, Hypothesis 1b was not
supported. Hypothesis 1c was that GIHS scores would correlate negatively with the count of
unwarranted beliefs both endorsed and claimed to have been carefully researched. GIHS scores
were unrelated to the count of unwarranted beliefs both endorsed and claimed to have been
carefully researched (rs = .01, p = .828). Thus, Hypothesis 1c was not supported.
Research Question 2
Hypothesis 2 was that GIHS scores would be negatively related to bias blind spot as
measured by the BSQ. GIHS scores were correlated positively with BSQ scores (r = .17, p <
.001). This relationship was larger in effect size than the relationship between BSQ and OSI (r =
.11, p = .017) and remained when controlling for OSI (B = .16, t[478] = 3.65, p < .001),
suggesting that GIHS scores predict overconfidence related to avoiding bias not solely
attributable to intelligence. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
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Research Question 3
The final set of hypotheses concerned the relationship between GIHS scores and political
polarization about global warming. Hypothesis 3a was that GIHS scores would moderate the
influence of political orientation on belief in global warming. Moderation analyses were
conducted according to the process described by Cohen (1968). GIHS scores did not
significantly moderate the influence of political orientation on belief in global warming (B = .02, t[477] = -.11, p = .91; Table 2.3). Thus, Hypothesis 3a was not supported. Hypothesis 3b
was that GIHS scores would predict belief in global warming when controlling for political
orientation (seen here and elsewhere as a negative relationship due to reversed scores). GIHS
scores significantly predicted belief in global warming when controlling for political orientation
(B = -.22, t(478) = 5.69, p < .001; Table 2.4). Thus, Hypothesis 3b was supported.
Exploratory Analyses
Additional analyses were conducted to further explore primary results. Given that GIHS
scores were not associated with the count of beliefs endorsed and were negatively correlated with
IEUB mean scores, follow-up analysis was conducted to probe whether GIHS scores predicted
stronger rejection of unwarranted beliefs. This analysis showed that GIHS scores were associated
with rejecting unwarranted beliefs as certainly false (rs = .15, p = .001).
To investigate the possibility that GIHS scores could show different relationships with
unwarranted beliefs depending on the content of the specific beliefs, analyses run for the full
scale IEUB score were repeated at the subscale level. Subscales from the IEUB showed largely
the same pattern of associations with GIHS scores as seen with full scale scores, though there
were some differences. Mean scores were significantly negatively correlated with GIHS scores
for the Health (r = -.13, p = .003) and Religion subscales (r = -.21, p < .001), and for the
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Religion subscale, GIHS scores were significantly negatively correlated with both the count of
items endorsed (rs = -.12, p = .009) and the count of items endorsed as certain (rs = -.12, p = .012;
Table 2.2). Given these observed relationships between GIHS scores and the Religion subscale
and in consideration of the possibility that, for some participants, Religion items may reflect
central rather than incidental religious beliefs (K. Dyer, personal communication, February 18,
2019), planned full-scale analyses were rerun with the Religion subscale removed to examine the
sensitivity of findings to this potential source of error. With the Religion subscale removed,
relationships between revised IEUB scores (IEUBr1) and GIHS scores were essentially similar.
For IEUBr1, GIHS scores were also negatively associated with mean scores (r = -.09, p = .043)
and positively associated with rejecting unwarranted beliefs as certainly false (rs = .12, p = .007).
For IEUBr1, GIHS scores were not associated with the count of beliefs endorsed as true (rs = .07, p = .117), were not associated with the count of beliefs endorsed as certainly true (rs = .04, p
= .349), and were not associated with the count of beliefs endorsed and claimed as carefully
researched (rs = .01, p = .828). Altogether, these findings suggest that the results of the primary
analyses are reflective of the relationship between GIHS scores and susceptibility to
epistemically unwarranted belief in general and not solely a function of any confounding bias
introduced by the Religion subscale.
Because GIHS scores were shown to predict belief in global warming, a follow-up
exploratory analysis was run to examine whether GIHS scores may moderate the influence of
political orientation on belief in global warming for those high in science intelligence, a
phenomenon that would be reflective of motivated reasoning (Kahan, et al., 2016). This analysis
was initially indeterminate due to the lack of an observed motivated reasoning effect (two-way
interaction between OSI and political orientation) either in a model including OSI and political
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orientation (B = .15, t[474] = 1.00, p = .32) or in two-way and three-way models including GIHS
(Table 2.5). However, because the narrower question of whether it is human activity that is
responsible for global warming is more polarizing than whether warming is occurring (McCright
et al., 2011), I suspected that the single item of the BAGW addressing the cause of global
warming (BAGW1) would be more likley to reflect motivated reasoning. After confirming that
BAGW1 was the item most strongly correlated with political orientation in the study sample (r =
-.51, p < .001; rs = -.53, p < .001), exploratory analyses were run with BAGW1 as the dependent
variable. As with the full scale, this single item was also reversed and log transformed to address
non-normal residual errors, at which point all assumptions for regression were met. GIHS scores
did not moderate the influence of political orientation on BAGW1, (B = -.12, t[477] = 0.58, p =
.571; Table 2.6). GIHS scores were again significantly associated with BAGW1 when
controlling for political orientation (B = -.13, t[477] = -3.39, p < .001, Table 2.7). In contrast
with BAGW, for BAGW1, a motivated reasoning effect was observed, with a significant OSIby-political orientation interaction consistent with a motivated reasoning effect (B = .36, t[474] =
2.29, p = .023; Table 2.8). Probing the OSI-by-political orientation interaction at the 16th and
84th percentile values for political orientation showed that for left (score of -3 or lower) and
central political orientations (-3 < score < 3), there was not a significant association between OSI
and disbelief in global warming (p values > .05). However, for those with right political
orientation (score of 3 or higher), increased OSI was associated with increased disbelief in
Global Warming (.12 < B < .17, p values < .05; Figure 2.1). Though it was expected that GIHS
scores should attenuate this effect in a three-way interaction, this was not observed (B = .09,
t(473) = .09, p = .929; Table 2.8). Importantly, however, it should be noted that the present study
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was underpowered to reliably detect such a three-way interaction effect, so the absence of an
effect found here should be interpreted with caution.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to conduct a set of more critical validity tests for
the GIHS. Tests were selected to be closely linked to theory, to be meaningfully difficult, and to
probe open questions from prior validity studies. Specifically, I set out to test whether the GIHS
predicted lesser likelihood of holding unwarranted beliefs, greater self-awareness concerning
one’s own epistemic limitations, and greater likelihood of aligning beliefs with evidence despite
the influence of political polarization. The findings of exploratory analyses were also reported.
In general, GIHS scores showed a pattern of results that does not support the proposed
interpretation of scores described its authors. The GIHS is described as reflecting a cognitive
disposition involving greater sensitivity to the potential fallibility of specific beliefs accompanied
by attentiveness to the evidentiary basis of beliefs and one’s own limitations with respect to
evaluating that evidence (Leary et al., 2017). It was expected that such a disposition would be
clearly reflected in lesser endorsement of unwarranted beliefs such as conspiracy theories,
pseudoscientific health claims, and paranormal beliefs. Instead, while GIHS scores showed a
small association with stronger rejection of unwarranted beliefs, GIHS scores did not predict a
lesser likelihood of endorsing unwarranted beliefs and did not predict a lesser likelihood of
endorsing unwarranted beliefs as certainly true. This finding is consistent with prior research
showing negligible or no significant relationship between GIHS scores and conspiratorial belief
(Bowes et al., 2021) and showing no significant relationship or only a small negative correlation
with specific forms of unwarranted belief (Bowes & Tasimi, 2021). The present study extends
prior research by showing that scores also did not predict lesser certainty that unwarranted
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beliefs are true, which has been argued to be more central to intellectual humility than just
holding justified beliefs (Hazlett, 2012; Whitcomb et al, 2017). Additionally, GIHS scores did
not predict lesser likelihood of endorsing an unwarranted belief despite claiming to have
carefully researched the issue to determine the truth of the matter, suggesting that GIHS scores
do not predict greater awareness of one’s own limitations with respect to evaluating evidence
pertaining to one’s beliefs. Notably, these small and null effects stand in contrast with
associations observed with science intelligence as measured by the OSI in this same sample,
which robustly predicted lesser endorsement of unwarranted beliefs, lesser endorsement of
unwarranted beliefs as certainly true, and lesser likelihood to endorse an unwarranted belief
despite claiming to have researched the topic.
Another expectation tested in this study was that GIHS scores would lessen bias blind
spot as measured with the BSQ. Contrary to this expectation, GIHS scores instead predicted
greater bias blind spot with a larger effect size than any other variable included in the study, and
this effect remained when controlling for cognitive sophistication in the form of science
intelligence. This finding suggests that GIHS scores may partially reflect excessive confidence
with respect to how well one manages one’s limitations, at least with respect to avoiding
cognitive bias (West et al., 2012). This is a noteworthy finding because prior research has found
the GIHS to be free from overclaiming bias (Deffler et al., 2016) and self-enhancement bias
(Haggard et al., 2018; Hill et al., 2021; Zachry et al., 2019), a problematic form of bias that has
consistently been associated with other instruments (Alfano et al., 2017, Haggard et al., 2018;
Hill et al., 2021; Zachry et al., 2019). The present study, however, shows that other forms of bias
more relevant to the self-report of the epistemic aspects of intellectual humility may not be
detected by general measures of desirable responding or self-enhancement.
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The most interesting finding for the GIHS came in what was expected to be the most
difficult test of the instrument – predicting belief in anthropogenic global warming among
political conservatives and attenuating political polarization about global warming. Because
GIHS scores are purported to reflect an orientation to evidence and because prior research has
shown GIHS scores to be predictive of lesser self-reported political polarization (Bowes et al.,
2020) and some IH-relevant outcomes among political conservatives (Leary et al., 2017), it was
expected that GIHS scores would predict lesser political polarization about a well-known issue
with a clear evidence-based position supported by broad scientific consensus. The present study
found GIHS scores to be strongly associated with belief in anthropogenic global warming
regardless of political orientation, but GIHS scores did not attenuate the influence of political
orientation on belief in global warming. This combination of findings was surprising because it
was assumed that any influence on belief in global warming among conservatives would result
from lesser susceptibility to political polarization and motivated reasoning. Instead, GIHS scores
predicted a similar increase in belief in global warming regardless of political orientation.
Exploratory follow-up analyses were conducted to investigate whether this positive influence of
GIHS scores on belief in global warming could attenuate a motivated reasoning effect. GIHS
scores were not shown to attenuate motivated reasoning, but this finding should be interpreted
with caution because the present study was underpowered for detecting the expected three-way
moderation effect. Given that results involving other unwarranted beliefs do not support the
GIHS as reflective of aligning beliefs with evidence, it seems that GIHS scores are likely
associated with greater belief in global warming for reasons other than the careful consideration
of evidence and rejection of politically motivated reasoning. One possibility is that GIHS scores
reflect an aspect of identity – identifying as someone who defers to evidence. This idea is
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consistent with the uniformly positive influence of GIHS scores on belief in global warming
regardless of political orientation and is consistent with research suggesting that belief in global
warming reflects personal factors rather than consideration of evidence (Nisbet & Scheufele,
2009). By contrast, if the effect were driven by greater attention to evidence, we might expect to
see a much larger change from Republican/Conservatives and little change at all for
Independents and Democrat/Liberals, with those high in IH generally converging at a similar
level of belief regardless of political orientation.
Findings in this study are also relevant to discussions of the relationship between
intellectual humility and religious belief. Whereas GIHS scores did not generally predict lesser
endorsement of epistemically unwarranted beliefs, lesser endorsement of such beliefs as certain,
or lesser tendency to endorse an unwarranted belief while also claiming to have researched the
topic, GIHS scores were negatively associated with all three of these outcomes for the Religion
subscale. In conjunction with the negative association between GIHS and reporting a relationship
with God, the present study adds to the body of literature showing self-reported intellectual
humility scores to be negatively related with variables connected to religious belief in a way that
suggests potential problems with measurement (Hill et al., 2021). In addition, the present study is
the first demonstration of self-reported intellectual humility being associated with being more
likely to actively disbelieve religious ideas. This is seen in scores being associated with
identifying as Atheist but not with identifying as Agnostic and in scores being associated with
expressing certainty that particular religious beliefs are false. These findings perhaps substantiate
the finding that GIHS scores did not predict greater acceptance of a pro-religion article, in
contrast to the alternative explanation that the lack of that effect was a function of the sample
(Leary et al., 2017). It seems likely that asking directly about willingness to change beliefs is a
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potential source of bias that causes scores to skew toward non-belief given that religious
individuals hold some beliefs as matters of faith that are not subject to ordinary processes of
evaluation and revision (Stanovich et al., 2019).
Finally, as the primary purpose of this study, these findings have implications for the
accuracy of self-report in the assessment of intellectual humility. Whereas those scoring highly
on the GIHS self-report as managing their beliefs with a grounding in evidence, the findings
from this study suggest that they are as likely as others to believe baseless ideas, to do so with
certainty, and to hold such beliefs despite having reportedly investigated the issue at hand. The
positive correlation between bias blind spot and GIHS scores also suggests a potentially inflated
idea of how well one manages one’s intellectual limitations, which would constitute a direct
threat to the response process upon which self-report measurement of intellectual humility is
predicated. Finally, while the correlation with belief in global warming would have been
powerful evidence of intellectual humility had it been accompanied by strong evidence of
aligning beliefs with evidence generally, instead that finding is suggestive of GIHS scores
reflecting an aspect of identity rather than a cognitive disposition, consistent with the alternative
interpretation of GIHS scores as reflective of values.
In summary, GIHS scores were here shown to produce noteworthy results with respect to
political identity yet failed to demonstrate expected relationships with the more general outcomes
of unwarranted beliefs and bias blind spot. While these findings are only the results from one
study, they are relatively straightforward departures from what would be expected from theory,
and it is appropriate to consider whether the limitations of the self-report method may be one
cause of these discrepancies. If so, similar problems may exist for the accuracy-related subscales
of other intellectual humility measures, and until greater clarity emerges through additional
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testing, it seems prudent to attend to the possibility of inaccurate self-report when interpreting
the scores of self-report intellectual humility measures.
Limitations
This study had several limitations. The use of a convenience sample likely introduced
sampling bias relevant to the results of this study. In particular, participants were more educated
than the general population, less likely to believe in God than the general population, less diverse
in race and ethnicity than the general population, and more left on left-right political orientation
than the general population. It also seems likely that participants were more media literate and
more likely to value scientific research given that they self-selected to be participants on a
crowdsourcing platform advertised as for scientific research. Though these were not qualities
that were assessed, media literacy and attitudes toward science may well have some relationship
to GIHS scores or other study variables. Additionally, despite the steps taken by Prolific to
support data quality, it is harder to know that respondents are who they say they are with respect
to nationality and harder know to that they are giving adequate effort to the task than it would be
for an in-person study. Another limitation was inadequate sample size to reliably detect a threeway interaction involving GIHS, OSI, and political orientation. Though such an effect was not
central to the predictions tested in this study, identifying and probing such an interaction could
reveal effects relevant to the study hypotheses. Finally, a similar study done in collaboration with
one or more GIHS authors would likely be stronger in every respect, especially in providing the
GIHS the best opportunities for success in the study design and the strongest defense in analysis
and interpretation.
Future Research
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Future research on the GIHS should explore the underlying cause of observed effects
involving political orientation. This would likely best be accomplished through gathering
qualitative data about the politically relevant outcomes to provide insight into the reasons for
departure from group norms. Future studies should also explore whether GIHS scores predict
against-group trends in belief or cognition for liberals or if such effects only occur for
conservatives. Namely, it would be important to see if GIHS scores promote greater alignment
with evidence for topics where liberals tend not be aligned with evidence, such as with the safety
of nuclear power, natural gas, and fracking (Nisbet et al., 2015) or overestimation of risk with
respect to some aspects of Covid-19 at the time of writing this (Lopez et al., 2021). Additionally,
future research should explore the possibility that GIHS scores and scores from subscales
covering similar content from other measures reflect values or an aspect of identity. If
identifying as a reasonable person has mild protective effects on some unwarranted beliefs and
contributes somewhat to acceptance of facts even on highly polarized issues, this could have
implications for intellectual humility and potentially practical applications as well.
More generally, future research should continue to investigate validity for measures of
intellectual humility. Similar objective or observational tests of validity for informant-report
could also be informative. For example, informant ratings or coder ratings on the GIHS might
show a different pattern of results for unwarranted beliefs, bias blind spot, or political
polarization as what was seen here. It may also be fruitful to experiment with small changes to
the measure such as making items explicit statements of values to remove the perverse influence
of intellectual humility, using sliders rather than Likert scales, or changing the instruction set.
Conclusion
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In the scientific study of intellectual humility, it is important to be aware of and attend to
the limitations of measurement instruments. For this reason, validity theorists have emphasized
the importance of following initial validation efforts with more critical tests of validity, and this
advice surely pertains to self-report measures of intellectual humility. By carefully attending to
theory, clearly linking theory to meaningfully difficult predictions, and being careful with the
interpretations of scores, self-report measures of intellectual humility measures can play an
important role in the overall study of intellectual humility.
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Table 2.1
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Primary Study Variables.
6
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
1
**
**
**
1. GIHS
0.84
-0.32
-0.21
0.05
-0.13
-0.09
-0.02
0.01
0.19**
r,t
**
1
**
**
**
**
**
2. BAGW
-0.34
0.94
0.57
-0.09
0.27
0.25
0.16
0.14
-0.14**
**
**
2
*
**
**
**
**
3. Political Orientation
-0.25
0.56
0.84
-0.10
0.29
0.33
0.33
0.24
-0.07
4. OSI
0.04
-0.12**
-0.12**
0.791
-0.44**
-0.45**
-0.37**
-0.18**
0.14**
**
**
**
**
1
**
**
**
5. IEUB Mean Score
-0.13
0.28
0.30
-0.45
0.85
0.90
0.65
0.48
-0.20**
**
**
**
**
1
**
**
6. IEUB Endorsed
-0.08
0.24
0.33
-0.43
0.91
0.91
0.76
0.57
-0.14**
7. IEUB Certain
-0.08
0.18**
0.31**
-0.35**
0.70**
0.77**
0.911
0.56**
-0.06
**
**
**
**
**
**
8. IEUB Endorsed/Researched
-0.04
0.14
0.23
-0.17
0.57
0.62
0.64
0.871
0.04
9. BSQ
0.17***
-0.12**
-0.01
0.11*
-0.17**
-0.11*
-0.04
0.03
0.811
M
4.01
0.65
-0.37
13.04
2.53
11.60
4.45
3.50
0.91
SD
0.66
2.75
2.75
3.33
0.70
8.00
5.72
4.47
0.87
r,t
Note. GIHS = General Intellectual Humility; BAGW = Reversed and Log-Transformed Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming; OSI = Ordinary
Science Intelligence 2.0; IEUB = Inventory of Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs; BSQ = Bias Blind Spot Questionnaire. Pearson correlations below
diagonal; Spearman correlations above diagonal. Reliability estimates on the diagonal. 1 McDonald’s Omega. 2 Cronbach’s Alpha. * p < .05. ** p <
.01. *** p < .001.

Table 2.2
GIHS Correlations with IEUB Subscales.
Mean
Count
Count Endorsed
Subscale
Score
Endorsed
as Certain
Paranormal
-0.06
-0.08
0.01
Religion
-0.21***
-0.12***
-0.11*
Health
-0.13**
-0.08
0.03
Extraordinary Life
-0.03
-0.01
0.06
Conspiracy
-0.06
-0.06
-0.04
Ghosts
-0.05
-0.01
0.01
Note. IEUB = Inventory of Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs. Pearson correlations for Mean Scores
and Spearman correlations reported for Count Endorsed and Count Endorsed as Certain. * p < .05. ** p
< .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 2.3
Two-Way Interaction Model of BAGW Reverse Scored and Log-Transformed
Variable
B
SE
β
t
Constant
1.39
0.13
10.88***
GIHS
-0.18
0.03
-0.21
-5.59***
Political Orientation (PO)
0.10
0.04
0.53
2.66**
PO X GIHS
0.00
0.01
-0.02
-0.11
Note. BAGW = Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming. GIHS = General Intellectual Humility
Scale. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001

Table 2.4
Main Effects Model of BAGW Reverse Scored and Log-Transformed
Variable
B
SE
β
t
Constant
1.40
0.13
11.13***
GIHS
-0.18
0.03
-0.22
-5.69***
Political Orientation
.10
0.01
0.51
13.43***
Note. BAGW = Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming. GIHS = General Intellectual Humility
Scale. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001

119
Table 2.5
Models of BAGW Reverse Scored and Log-Transformed with Political Orientation, GIHS, and OSI as predictor variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Main Effects
2-way Interactions
3-way Interactions
Variable
B
SE
β
t
B
SE
β
t
B
SE
β
t
***
**
Intercept
1.50
0.15
10.20
1.77
0.54
3.29
1.76
0.56
3.18**
Political Orientation (PO)
0.10
0.01
0.50 13.20***
0.07
0.05
0.37
1.46
0.08
0.18
0.39
0.42
***
GIHS
-0.18
0.03 -0.22 -5.68
-0.24
0.13 -0.30
-1.85
-0.24
0.14 -0.30 -1.79
OSI
-0.01
0.01 -0.05 -1.32
-0.03
0.04 -0.18
-0.71
-0.03
0.04 -0.18 -0.70
PO X GIHS
0.00
0.01 -0.01
-0.04
-0.00
0.04 -0.03 -0.03
OSI X PO
0.00
0.00
0.15
1.00
0.00
0.01
0.13
0.13
GIHS X OSI
0.01
0.01
0.16
0.53
0.01
0.01
0.16
0.52
GIHS X OSI X PO
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.02
Note. BAGW = Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming; GIHS = General Intellectual Humility Scale; OSI = Ordinary Science
Intelligence 2.0. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
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Table 2.6
Interaction Model of Single-Item BAGW1 Reverse Scored and Log-Transformed
Variable
B
SE
β
t
Constant
1.22
0.15
7.90***
GIHS
-0.12
0.04
-0.13
-3.25**
Political Orientation (PO)
0.14
0.01
0.60
2.88**
PO X GIHS
-0.01
0.01
-0.12
0.58
Note. BAGW1 = Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming single item indicator. GIHS = General
Intellectual Humility Scale. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001

Table 2.7
Main Effects Model of Single-Item BAGW1 Reverse Scored and Log-Transformed
Variable
B
SE
β
t
Constant
1.24
.15
8.18***
GIHS
-.13
.04
-.13
-3.39***
Political Orientation
.11
.01
.49
12.20***
Note. BAGW1 = Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming single item indicator. GIHS = General
Intellectual Humility Scale. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
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Table 2.8
Models of Single-Item BAGW1 Reverse-Scored and Log-Transformed with Political Orientation, GIHS, and OSI as Predictor Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Main Effects
2-way Interactions
3-way Interaction
Variable
B
SE
β
t
B
SE
β
t
B
SE
β
t
***
**
Intercept
1.18 0.18 6.63
2.14 0.65 3.31
2.12
0.67
3.17**
Political Orientation (PO)
0.11 0.01 0.49 12.19***
0.05 0.06 0.20 0.77
0.06
0.22
0.29
0.29
**
*
GIHS
-0.13 0.04 -0.14 -3.39
-0.37 0.16 -0.39 -2.31
-0.36
0.16 -0.38 -2.22*
OSI
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.67
-0.07 0.05 -0.38 -1.46
-0.07
0.05 -0.37 -1.40
PO X GIHS
-0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.28
-0.01
0.05 -0.14 -0.15
*
OSI X PO
0.01 0.00 0.36 2.29
0.01
0.02
0.27
0.27
GIHS X OSI
0.02 0.01 0.49 1.58
0.02
0.01
0.49
1.53
GIHS X OSI X PO
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.09
Note. BAGW1 = Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming single item indicator. GIHS = General Intellectual Humility Scale. OSI =
Ordinary Science Intelligence 2.0. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
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Figure 2.1
Motivated Reasoning and Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming

Note. Two-way interaction between political orientation and Ordinary Science Intelligence in predicting lesser
belief in anthropogenic global warming as measured by the reversed and log-transformed Belief in
Anthropogenic Global Warming single-item indicator.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Demographics
1. What was your assigned sex at birth?
a. Male
b. Female
2. What is your gender?
3. What is your age?
4. What is your race?
a. White/Caucasian
b. Black/African-American
c. Asian/Pacific Islander
d. Hispanic/Latino/a
e. Multiracial (please make sure to click all that apply)
f. Other
5. What is your current marital status?
a. Single
b. Married/partnered
c. Separated
d. Divorced
e. Widowed
f. Other
6. What is or was your academic major? (If multiple or graduate school, list them all)
7. I have a relationship with God or a higher being.
a. True
b. False
8. What is your religious/spiritual affiliation (e.g., Methodist, Catholic, Judaism/Orthodox,
Atheist, Agnostic)
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Appendix B: Study Questionnaire
General Intellectual Humility Scale (Leary et al., 2017)

Below are a number of statements about personal characteristics. Please carefully read each item
in the list and select the appropriate number indicating to what degree each statement best
describes you. For instance, if a statement is not at all like you, choose 1, but if a statement
is very much like you, choose 5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

I question my own opinions, positions, and viewpoints because they could be wrong.
I reconsider my opinions when presented with new evidence.
I recognize the value in opinions that are different from my own.
I accept that my beliefs and attitudes may be wrong.
In the face of conflicting evidence, I am open to changing my opinions.
I like finding out new information that differs from what I already think is true.

Inventory of Epistemically Unwarranted Beliefs (Dyer & Hall, 2018)
Each of the statements below describes a belief some people hold related to a given subject. For
each subject, indicate whether you personally believe the given statement to be true or
false by selecting the response that most closely matches your opinion. Use the following scale:
1 = Sure it’s false to 5 = Sure it’s true. [response options: 1 = Sure it’s false, 2 = Uncertain, but
think it’s false, 3 = Really don’t know, 4 = Uncertain, but think it’s true, 5 = Sure it’s true]
1. Age of the Earth: The Earth is about 4.5 billion years old.
2. Acupuncture: Inserting needles in the skin at specific points on the body can relieve
symptoms and treat diseases.
3. Alien abduction: Extraterrestrial beings sometimes abduct human subjects for study, and
then return them, often with no memory of the event.
4. Ancient astronauts: Extra-terrestrial beings helped ancient humans build pyramids and
other ancient wonders.
5. Angels: There are benevolent spiritual beings who act as protectors or guides for human
beings.
6. Animism: Spirits and souls exist in all things (animals, plants, inanimate objects) and can
affect the material world.
7. Anti-Vaccination Movement: Routine childhood vaccines cause developmental problems
such as autism in some children.
8. Area 51: The US government is hiding evidence of alien spacecraft and creatures under
high security at places like Area 51 in Nevada.
9. Astrology: The location of the planets and stars at the time of one’s birth are directly
related to one’s personality and path of life.
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10. Axial Tilt: The seasons on Earth are caused by the tilt of the Earth on its axis as it orbits
the Sun.
11. Bermuda Triangle: The Bermuda Triangle is a special location on the planet that, for
unknown reasons, causes ships and aircraft to crash or disappear more often than
anywhere else on the planet.
12. Big Bang Theory: The beginning of the universe is best explained by the Big Bang
Theory.
13. Bigfoot: A large ape-like mammal lives in some northwestern US forests and is
sometimes encountered by hikers.
14. Brain Capacity: Humans only use about 10% of their brains at any one point in time.
15. Coelacanth: A large fish (up to six feet long), barely changed by evolution for hundreds
of millions of years, long believed to be extinct, is still living in the world’s oceans.
16. Chemtrails: The white streaks left in the sky behind airplanes contain chemicals released
purposely on the population for nefarious purposes.
17. Chiropractic: Manipulation of the back can effectively cure most physical maladies by
aligning the spinal column.
18. Chicxulub Asteroid: Approximately 65 million years ago a large asteroid impact caused
the extinction of the dinosaurs.
19. Chupacabra: A predatory animal lives unknown to biology in the southwestern US and
Latin America and attacks livestock and drains their blood.
20. Climate Change: Alterations of the atmosphere due to human activity are causing a
dangerous warming of the Earth.
21. Creationism: All forms of life on Earth were created at one time in history and have not
changed.
22. Faith Healing: People can be healed of serious illness by a charismatic religious leader
who lays on hands and/or casts out demons.
23. ESP (extra-sensory perception): It is possible to communicate mind-to-mind without
using the five known senses.
24. Full Moon: A full moon causes people to behave oddly and sometimes violently.
25. Ghosts: Disembodied spirits can occasionally communicate with or be seen by living
people.
26. GMO Risk (Genetically Modified Organisms): Foods produced using GMOs present a
risk to human health.
27. Graphology: Characteristics of handwriting (shape and size of letters etc.) can reflect
personality traits of the writer.
28. Haunting: Houses can be inhabited by the spirits of those who died in unusual ways.
29. Heaven and Hell: Human behavior on Earth will be rewarded or punished in the afterlife
by condemnation to hell or reception in heaven.
30. Heliocentrism: The Sun is the center of the solar system and the Earth revolves around it.
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31. Holocaust: The Nazi Holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s caused the deaths of over 11
million people, many of whom were Jewish.
32. Homeopathy: Alternative medicine using natural substances, very highly diluted, can
effectively treat symptoms that would be caused by the very same substances.
33. Human Evolution: Humans and chimpanzees once shared a common ancestor, and these
species diverged millions of years ago.
34. Lucky Numbers: Some numbers and dates are more lucky or unlucky than others, such as
Friday the 13th or the number 7.
35. Mars Rover: NASA is currently exploring the surface of Mars with remotely controlled
automated motor vehicles.
36. Moon Landing: The United States landed humans on the Moon and returned them to
Earth between 1969 and 1972.
37. Mozart Effect: Listening to classical music in early childhood produces improved math
skills.
38. Near Death Experiences: Some people who are close to death but are then revived,
directly experience the afterlife.
39. Ouija Board: Ouija boards can be used to contact the spirit world, whose spirits answer
questions by guiding the participants’ hands on a device that spells out a response.
40. Prayer for Healing: Prayer is effective for treating people with illnesses and injuries.
41. Psychic Detectives: Some people can use psychic abilities to solve crimes by identifying
where a body is buried or sensing whether or a kidnap victim is alive or dead.
42. Psychokinesis: Some people can move objects solely with the power of their mind.
43. Reincarnation: After death, we come back as the same spirit in a new body, occasionally
with memory of past lives.
44. Satanic Ritual Abuse: Satanic cults in many communities in the US kidnap children for
ritual sexual abuse.
45. Self-Esteem: Frequent praise from parents and teachers helps to raise children’s selfesteem, which promotes success in life.
46. Sept 11 Conspiracy: Members of the US government were involved in the planning and
execution of the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
47. Sugar: Eating a lot of sugar makes kids hyper.
48. Therapeutic Touch: Some health professionals have the power to heal others by moving
the hands over the patient’s energy field to balance it, and transferring personal energy to
the patient, thus healing them.
49. UFOs (Unidentified Flying Objects): Spacecraft piloted by beings not from Earth
sometimes visit Earth.
50. Water Fluoridation: Fluoride is added to public water supply in order to create a more
compliant population that can be easily controlled by a corrupt government.
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Ordinary Science Intelligence 2.0 (Kahan, 2017)
1. All radioactivity is man-made.
a. True
b. False
2. Lasers work by focusing sound waves.
a. True
b. False
3. Electrons are smaller than atoms.
a. True
b. False
4. Which gas makes up most of the Earth’s atmosphere?
a. Hydrogen
b. Nitrogen
c. Carbon Dioxide
d. Oxygen
5. Does the Earth go around the Sun, or does the Sun go around the Earth? [only if
‘earth/around sun’]: How long does it take for the Earth to go around the Sun?
a. 1 day
b. 1 month
c. 1 year)
6. Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria.
a. True
b. False
7. Two scientists want to know if a certain drug is effective against high blood pressure. The
first scientist wants to give the drug to 1000 people with high blood pressure and see how
many of them experience lower blood pressure levels. The second scientist wants to give
the drug to 500 people with high blood pressure and not give the drug to another 500
people with high blood pressure and see how many in both groups experience lower
blood pressure levels. Which is the better way to test this drug?
a. The first way
b. The second way
8. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup means that they’ve got one in four
chances of having a child with an inherited illness. Does this mean that if their first child
has the illness, the next three will not?
a. Yes
b. No
9. Does this mean that each of the couple’s children will have the same risk of suffering
from the illness?
a. Yes
b. No
10. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how many times
do you think the die would come up as an even number? [open ended: 50% of or
equivalent]
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11. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1000 people each
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? [open ended: 10 or equivalent]
12. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1000.
What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? [open
ended: 0.1% or equivalent]
13. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a
_____% chance of getting the disease. [open ended: 20 or equivalent]
14. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the
disease out of 1000? [open ended: 100 or equivalent]
15. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a
mammogram. Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant tumor and
90 of them do not. Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the mammogram
indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 of them
does not have a tumor. Of the 90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammogram
indicates correctly that 80 of them do not have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 10
of them do have a tumor. The table below summarizes all of this information.
Actually has tumor
Does not have tumor
Totals

Tested positive
9
10
19

Tested negative
1
80
81

totals
10
90
100

Imagine that your friend tests positive (as if she had a tumor), what is the likelihood that
she actually has a tumor? ___ out of ___ [open ended: 9, 19]
16. If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? ___ minutes [open ended: 5]
17. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? ___ cents [open ended: 5]
18. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake? ___ days [open ended: 47]

Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming (Hennes et al., 2016)
For the following items, please select the option that best reflects your personal beliefs about the
subject of global warming on a scale from 1 (Definitely not; Not at all likely) to 7 (Definitely,
Extremely likely).
1.
2.
3.
4.

Do you believe that global warming is anthropogenic (caused by human behavior)?
Do you believe that global warming is occurring?
Do you believe that global warming is a hoax?
How likely do you think it is that, in your lifetime, the effects of global warming will be
noticeable (species extinction, glacial melting, severe weather such as hurricanes,
increased temperatures?
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5. How likely do you think it is that global warming is occurring?
6. How likely do you think it is that scientists will eventually discover that global warming
is NOT man-made after all?
7. How likely do you think it is that global warming is a hoax?

Bias Blind Spot Questionnaire (West et al., 2012)
1. Outcome Bias: Psychologists have found that people tend to judge the quality of a
decision based on how the decision worked out. That is, people sometimes forget that the
quality of the decision must be judged on what was known at the time the decision was
made, not how it worked out, because the outcome is not known at the time of the
decision. It is a mistake to judge a decision maker’s ability, after the fact, based mostly
on the outcome of the decision. When people do this, it is called outcome bias.
a. To what extent do you believe you are likely to commit outcome bias? [response
options: 1 = Not at all likely 5 = Very likely]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is likely to commit outcome
bias? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
2. Framing Effect: Psychologists have shown that people tend to evaluate statements,
arguments, or policies differently depending on the choice of words. This means that
people’s opinions of the very same policy or decision or product can be manipulated by
slight changes in wording that don’t change the meaning. For example, a food item
labeled “98% fat free” is judged more attractive than one labeled “contains 2% fat.”
When people’s opinions are manipulated based on a rewording that does not change the
meaning, this is termed a framing effect.
a. To what extent do you believe you are likely to be susceptible to framing effects?
[response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is likely to be susceptible to
framing effects? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like
me]
3. Base-Rate Neglect: Psychologists have shown that people tend to ignore overall
probabilities when judging how likely something is and instead focus too much on the
specific situation. For example, when judging the likelihood of a shark attack, people
tend to focus on a news report of a single attack, rather than on the fact that although
several millions of people swim in ocean water, only a few people are killed by sharks
every year. When people focus on the specific example and ignore the overall
probability, this is termed base-rate neglect.
a. To what extent do you believe you are likely to commit base-rate neglect?
[response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is likely to commit base-rate
neglect? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
4. Psychologists have found that people tend to rate conjunctions of events (situations where
two or more events must each happen) as too likely. Conjunctions of events become less
likely as the number of events grows. For example, (A) people might estimate that next
year there is a 1% chance that a fire in California will kill 200 people. At the same time,
(B) they might estimate that next year there is a 3% chance that an earthquake in
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California will cause a fire that will kill 200 people. However, if Event B (both
earthquake and fire) happens, then Event A (fire) also happens, so Event A can’t be less
likely. When people fail to lower the probabilities as the number of conjoined events
grows, this is called a conjunction error.
a. To what extent do you believe you are likely to be susceptible to conjunction
effects? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is likely to be susceptible to
conjunction effects? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much
like me]
5. Anchoring and Adjustment: Psychologists have found that people making numerical
estimations tend to focus on any number that is available to help them. This is a good
strategy, except in situations where the available numbers are unrelated to the quantity we
are trying to estimate. For example, people report fewer headaches when they are asked:
“How many headaches do you have a month— 0, 1, 2— how many?” than when they are
asked: “How many headaches do you have a month—5, 10, 15— how many?” When our
estimations are affected by quantities that are irrelevant to what we are estimating, this is
called an anchoring effect.
a. To what extent do you believe you are likely to be susceptible to anchoring
effects? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is likely to be susceptible to
anchoring effects? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like
me]
6. Myside Bias: Psychologists have found that people do not evaluate the evidence fairly
when they already have an opinion on the issue. That is, they tend to evaluate the
evidence as being more favorable to their own opinion than it actually is. When people do
this, it is called myside bias.
a. To what extent do you believe you are likely to be susceptible to myside bias?
[response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is likely to be susceptible to
myside bias? [response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
7. Cellphone Hazard: Researchers have found that drivers are four times more likely to be
involved in a serious auto accident during those times when they are talking on cell
phones. This effect has been called the cell phone hazard.
a. To what extent do you believe that you are (or would be more likely to be) more
hazardous during times when you drive while using a cell phone? [response
options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]
b. To what extent do you believe the average American is (or would be more likely
to be) more hazardous during times when they drive while using a cell phone?
[response options: 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me]

